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To what degree may the US be considered a normative power? The US foreign policy 
mainstream tends to reflect a varying blend of normative and hegemonic approaches. The 
US has been and continues to be simultaneously a guardian of international norms; a 
norm entrepreneur challenging prevailing norms as insufficient; a norm externaliser when 
it tries to advance norms for others that it is reluctant to apply to itself; and a norm 
blocker when it comes to issues that may threaten its position, or that exacerbate divisions 
among conflicting currents of American domestic thought. On balance (and despite 
exceptions), the US has sought to manage this normative-hegemonic interplay by 
accepting some limits on its power in exchange for greater legitimacy and acceptance of its 
leadership by others. The unresolved question today is whether the US and other key 
players are prepared to stick with this bargain. Closer examination of the US case also 
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THE UNITED STATES: 
A NORMATIVE POWER? 




s the US a normative power? How does it act, what does it seek to achieve and what are the 
conditioning factors determining or guiding its actions? To what extent is the normative 
nature of US foreign policy due to the nature of its society and to what extent is it due to the 
status and role of the US within the international system? 
To facilitate the comparisons intended by this project, I have aligned myself with the general 
approach outlined by Nathalie Tocci in her paper (Tocci, 2007). After presenting a number of 
case studies, I come to a conclusion similar to that reached by the authors of the other empirical 
working papers: if by a normative foreign policy we mean pursuing normative goals through 
normatively deployed instruments and having a discernible normative impact, then one can 
conclude, perhaps inevitably, that the US is not always a normative international actor. The 
eight case studies underscore how the US has at times been a norm entrepreneur and at other 
times a norm blocker; it has acted with the coldest calculations of Realpolitik, behaved more as 
a hegemon but at times also as an imperial power, and has been content with the status quo. It 
has had successes and failures.  
In and of themselves, however, the case studies tell us little about where the centre of gravity 
lies in US foreign policy, or which of these stylised foreign policy types best characterises the 
US role in the world. For that reason I have supplemented each case study with various other 
examples of normative, imperial/hegemonic, Realpolitik or status quo policies. Throughout the 
process, however, I have found myself confronted with some troubling or incomplete aspects of 
the notion of ‘normative’ power as well as the overall framework. Thus some preliminary 
comments on the theme itself seem to be in order. 
1. Normative  power? 
In her introductory essay, Nathalie Tocci (2007, p. 10) sets a high bar for considering any 
country to be a normative power. “A normative foreign policy”, she states, “would pursue 
normative goals through normatively deployed means and it would be effective in fulfilling its 
normative intent”. If this is the test, then the United States is not a normative power. Neither is 
the EU. In fact, no nation on earth could pass this test with any consistency.  
On its own, the label ‘normative power’ is too categorical, too one-dimensional and too static to 
capture the complex and dynamic nature of any country’s foreign policy. Nations employ a 
variety of instruments to advance a range of foreign policy goals, and both instruments and 
goals change over time. The issue is really less whether a nation is a ‘normative power’, but the 
degree to which it is one.
1 This requires a framework that establishes some weighting, or 
                                                      
* Daniel S. Hamilton is the Richard von Weizsäcker Professor and Director of the Center for Transatlantic 
Relations at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins 
University, Washington, D.C. 
1 See the critique of the fashionable notion of Germany as a ‘civilian power’ by Tewes (1998, p. 353). 
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illuminates some relationship, between normative ends and means and other interests and 
instruments of a nation’s foreign policy, both in particular circumstances and over time. As 
Tocci states, the challenge is to identify under what conditions and circumstances an 
international player seeks normative goals through normative means, and achieves normative 
results, as opposed to other types of ends, means, and outcomes. 
A related question is what we mean by norms. Norms are generally understood as standards of 
appropriate behaviour. ‘Appropriate’, of course, is subjective. Who sets the standard? For 
Stephen Krasner (1983, p. 2), appropriate behaviour should be measured in terms of “rights and 
obligations” toward others. For Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, appropriate behaviour 
is determined from within, by “actors with a given identity” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; 
Finnemore, 1996, p. 22; Katzenstein, 1996, p.5; Simon & Martini, 2005, p. 2). Krasner 
highlights external factors; Finnemore and Sikkink underscore internal influences. Each aspect 
is important as we examine to what degree the United States is a normative power. 
Finnemore and Sikkink’s reference to constitutive norms that create identity or define interests 
is relevant to the literature on EU foreign policy and ‘normative power EU’, which underscore 
the importance of norms as an instrument in identity politics. Ian Manners posits that the EU’s 
allegedly ‘normative’ role in foreign policy can be explained in part by the sui generis nature of 
the EU itself. What the EU is, he contends, is the principal explanation for what it does beyond 
its borders (Manners, 2002; Whitman, 1998). In his own paper for this project, Brantley 
Womack underscores the need to understand a nation's own norms in order to assess the extent 
to which that nation could be considered a normative foreign policy actor. “Understanding 
China in its own terms as an intentional actor”, Womack (2008, p. 1) states, “would be a 
prerequisite to understanding China as a normative foreign policy actor.” 
This is true for the United States as well. To understand the degree to which the US may be 
considered a normative power, one must seek to understand how it understands its own norms. 
To understand what the US does, one needs to understand something of what America is – the 
nature of American society and the various and often conflicting domestic currents that drive 
US foreign policy. Before turning to specific case studies, therefore, I offer below some 
background on the domestic roots of foreign policy. 
The external dimension deserves additional comment as well. Krasner’s approach and Tocci’s 
introductory framework focus more on regulative norms that order or constrain behaviour. This 
leads us to consider international law as a common ‘normative boundary’ and standard for our 
comparative case studies. Yet the normative boundaries of international law can be quite 
blurred. International law offers no clear or easy normative guide, for example, when it comes 
to trade-offs between national sovereignty and respect for human rights. Today, when the 
world’s most lethal conflicts take place within states rather than between them, the claim of 
national sovereignty can be – and is – invoked as a normative barrier shielding massive 
violations of human rights. Womack also questions Tocci’s reduction of what is ‘normative’ to 
the benchmark of international law, and cites instances when international law has been wielded 
by the strong against the weak in clear violation of what might generally be considered 
‘appropriate behaviour’. 
In short, established norms can be difficult to change, especially as they become 
institutionalised in formal organisations or enshrined in law. And yet they may fail to deal with 
new or other normative challenges, or may themselves pose trade-offs between different norms. 
The dramatic structural upheaval of the post-cold war period has posed significant challenges to 
such fundamental norms as state sovereignty, non-intervention, the legitimate use of force and 
multilateralism, which have underpinned the international institutional order since World War II 
(Job, 2006, p. 56). The Iraq crisis exposed a number of structural and normative challenges to 
the notion of a UN-centred world order. Some of these challenges, it seems, can be resolved THE UNITED STATES: A NORMATIVE POWER? | 3 
 
only with institutional reform. Other challenges may be resolved through the reinforcement or 
re-articulation of existing norms, or by the creation of new ones (Thakur & Sidhu, 2006, pp. 
520-521). 
In this context, Finnemore and Sikkink refer to the ‘life cycle’ of norms and discuss the role of 
‘norm entrepreneurs’ and ‘norm blockers’ in the evolution of norms over time. They describe 
the strength of norms as evolving through a ‘life cycle’ of three stages. In the norm emergence 
stage, norm entrepreneurs attempt to convince others to follow their desired norm. In the norm 
cascade stage, the ‘norm leaders’ – those who have accepted the norm – attempt to socialize 
others to accept the norm and become ‘norm followers’. Some budding norms may fail in either 
the emergence or cascade stages, if the entrepreneurs or norm leaders are unable to convince 
enough states to follow them. Norms that pass through the first two stages reach the norm 
internalisation stage, by the end of which “norms acquire a taken-for-granted quality and are no 
longer a matter of broad public debate” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, pp. 895-905).
  
Norm entrepreneurs are early catalysts who create the initial momentum behind consideration of 
new norms. Norm blockers contest and resist new norms, rather than create and support them. 
They challenge the new ‘framings’ advanced by norm entrepreneurs, using a logic that reaffirms 
the need and desirability to adhere to more deeply embedded norms. For norm entrepreneurs to 
succeed in their effort to win wide support and perhaps even institutionalization of new norms, 
they must also engage the holdouts, or norm blockers, who continue to reject their relevance or 
‘appropriateness’. If the norm entrepreneurs succeed, the second step is to define and then 
enforce adherence to such new norms (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Job, 2006).
2  
When it comes to considering the United States (as well as the EU and other actors), the notions 
of normative life cycles, norm entrepreneurs and norm blockers seem more apt descriptions than 
the sweeping, one-dimensional, static designation of ‘normative power’.
3 The term “normative 
power” relates to being rather than acting, what it is rather than what it does, whereas norm 
entrepreneur suggests more what Manners describes – that the EU, on occasion and on certain 
issues, has sought to advance new norms.  
A further distinction of relevance to the US is that between norm entrepreneurs who seek to 
establish and apply particular norms to all actors, including themselves, throughout the 
international system, and what may be called ‘norm externalisers’, i.e. actors that seek to 
advance new norms for others but not for themselves. 
Zaki Laïdi (Laïdi, 2007, for instance, suggests that normative power refers to the capacity to 
produce and put in place a global framework of norms that applies to all, including the most 
powerful. Therefore, when considering the degree to which the US is a normative power, it is 
important to examine the extent to which the US has felt bound to the rules or norms it has 
sought to implement, or under what circumstances it has acted to exempt itself from the very 
frameworks it has helped to establish.  
Ian Manners is careful not to exclude the use of military force or economic sanctions from his 
definition of ‘normative power’. This is particularly important, because the role of coercive and 
non-coercive means in advancing particular norms is critical when examining the role of the 
United States. Is the US more easily able to be a normative power because it has the means to 
                                                      
2 For the difficulties in this ‘second stage’, particularly for the EU, see Katzenstein (2006). For the role of 
“norm entrepreneurs in the campaign against terrorism, see Simon & Martini (2005). For issues involved 
in the UN as ‘norm entrepreneur’, see Månsson (2002). 
3 This role is not exclusive to the US or the EU, of course; other countries have played such a role at 
certain times. It is not even limited to states, since non-state actors can at times advance norms that 
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set and enforce norms? Is it less of a normative power because it has the means to avoid 
adhering to such norms? 
Tocci mentions “inaction” as an important element in any consideration of normative power, but 
the framework with which we have been asked to work emphasises action over inaction. Failure 
to act in defence of widely-shared norms, however, must also be included. For instance, 
shouldn’t the failure of the US, the EU and other major powers to act in the face of genocide in 
Rwanda be considered as part of the discourse on normative power? 
Finally, upon closer inspection it seems as if the normative-Realpolitik categories offer more of 
a continuum than the imperial-status quo categories. The first two have to do with underlying 
notions of ideals and interests; the second two reflect more how actors relate to relative power. 
For nations with less relative power, the imperial option is not available while the status quo 
option facilitates free-riding. Nations that possess what might be called systemic power, on the 
other hand, face tougher choices: Do they use such power to change prevailing norms (what 
Tocci would label imperial), or do they use such power primarily to preserve the status quo? 
Was the American-led post-war order normative, imperial or something else? This schematic 
also seems to ignore the issue posed by rising powers, who have a third option, which may be 
called revisionism or revolutionary, i.e. whether to turn over the apple cart of the prevailing 
system altogether, either for normative or Realpolitik reasons.  
In short, in the idealised world of the four paradigms, the mutually exclusive nature of each 
paradigm seems to break down along the normative/Realpolitik and imperial/status quo lines. 
Can’t a normative actor prefer the status quo? Can’t a Realpolitik actor also act imperially?  
The assumption inherent in this framework is that normative influence can be measured by such 
metrics of international law as the number of new treaties signed. Yet that begs questions of 
effective implementation and the degree to which new norms are internalised within nations. 
The EU is particularly bad in this area; a cursory review of EU agreements indicates that 
implementation lags woefully across member states.  
Some of the literature on normative power is troubling in this regard, because it tends to focus 
on the number of states signing up behind a particular norm rather than how many states 
actively change their behaviour as a result of the norm becoming accepted. Finnemore & 
Sikkink (1998), Adriana Lins de Albuquerque (2007), Suzanne Katzenstein (2006) and others, 
however, make the case that the only way to measure the influence of norms is to examine 
whether they cause states to act differently than they would in the absence of the norm, i.e. 
whether the government or population of a country actually internalises the norm over time. 
I draw on these various points in the following three sections. I begin with the domestic roots of 
US foreign policy, and how the struggles between competing conceptions of America’s role in 
the world affect consideration of the United States as a normative actor. The next section offers 
specific cases of US foreign policy within the framework suggested by Nathalie Tocci. The final 
section summarises and offers some final conclusions. 
2.  Domestic Currents and US Foreign Policy 
The US is a perplexing case. On the one hand, norms and values permeate US foreign policy 
declarations and documents. The very founding of the Republic in the 18
th century was 
grounded and justified by normative assertions and universal values. In the 20
th century, the US 
was arguably the world’s greatest champion of multilateral rules and institutions, and a fierce 
advocate of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. No other country has advanced such 
far-reaching and elaborate ideas about how rules and multilateral institutions might be 
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This was particularly true in the aftermath of the Second World War. Ramesh Thakur and 
Weheguru Pal Singh Sidhu (2006, p. 5) comment:  
After World War II, Washington was the chief architect of the normative structure of world 
order based on the international rule of law. There was, alongside this, deep and widespread 
confidence in the United States as a fundamentally trustworthy, balanced and responsible 
custodian of world order, albeit with occasional lapses and eccentricities.  
Samuel Huntington (1999, pp. 35-38) added this in 1999: 
In a fashion and to an extent that is unique in the history of Great Powers, the United States 
defines its strength – indeed its very greatness – not in terms of its ability to achieve or 
maintain dominance over others, but in terms of its ability to work with others in the 
interests of the international community as a whole. 
On the other hand, the US has also consistently resisted entangling itself in institutional 
commitments and obligations.  It has been reluctant to tie itself too tightly to the normative 
standards and principles it has championed for others. It has used military force on a fairly 
regular basis, and has intervened overtly and covertly across borders on a range of issues. Eliot 
Cohen (Cohen, 2005, p. 16) highlights this apparent dichotomy in American attitudes and 
actions:  
The Woodrow Wilson who proclaimed the ideal of open covenants openly arrived at sent 
the US Marines to Veracruz and presided over a naval build-up designed to displace the 
Royal Navy as the arbiter of international order; and the Richard Nixon who, more than 
most 20
th-century presidents, saw the world in the pale grey light of Realpolitik spoke the 
language of both arms control and human rights.  
The 2003 US invasion of Iraq exposed these contradictory impulses perhaps as never before. 
Robert Tucker and David C. Hendrickson (2004, p. 32) sum it up:  
World opinion now sees the United States increasingly as an outlier – invoking 
international law when convenient, and ignoring it when not; using international institutions 
when they work to its advantage, and disdaining them when they pose obstacles to US 
designs.  
How can we account for these contradictory impulses? Robert E. Osgood captured this 
quandary in his seminal book Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations, which 
discusses how the United States has always struggled with the tension between the ideals at the 
core of the American Republic and the realities imposed by a harsh world.
4 The United States is 
not alone in facing such dilemmas, of course, but the peculiar origins of the American Republic, 
together with its current power, render them particularly acute.  
Unfortunately, much standard analysis, which tends to classify US foreign policy debates as 
those between realists and idealists, hawks and doves, unilateralists and multilateralists, or 
isolationists and interventionists, does not adequately address the points raised above, 
particularly the domestic forces that often drive foreign policy, and is unlikely to help us get to 
the core of the issue: whether, or to what degree, the US might be considered a ‘normative 
power’.  
Moreover, examining US foreign policy through these lenses often leads to distorted or 
misleading interpretations, which engenders sympathy with those foreign observers who are 
often baffled by the swings and contradictions in US foreign policy. Particularly for our exercise 
it is important to understand that there are many different political traditions in the US that 
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reflect divergent and often competing ideas of how the US should relate to the rest of the world. 
Therefore, before examining the various case studies and typologies set forth by Nathalie Tocci, 
I believe it useful to look at the question of the US as a normative power by reviewing a 
framework developed by Walter Russell Mead, derived from work by historian David Hackett 
Fischer (1989).
5 
According to Mead (2002, p. xvii), 
Americans through the centuries seem to have four basic ways of looking at foreign policy, 
which have contrasting and sometimes complementary ways of looking at domestic policy 
as well. Hamiltonians regard a strong alliance between the national government and big 
business as the key both to domestic stability and to effective action abroad, and they have 
long focused on the nation’s need to be integrated into the global economy on favorable 
terms.  Wilsonians believe that the United States has both a moral obligation and an 
important national interest in spreading American democratic and social values throughout 
the world, creating a peaceful international community that accepts the rule of law. 
Jeffersonians hold that American foreign policy should be less concerned about spreading 
democracy abroad than about safeguarding it at home; they have historically been skeptical 
about Hamiltonian and Wilsonian policies that involve the United States with unsavory 
allies abroad or that increase the risks of war. Finally a large populist school I call 
Jacksonian believes that the most important goal of the US government in both foreign and 
domestic policy should be the physical security and the economic well-being of the 
American people. 
Mead names his schools after leading figures in American history. He does not seek to ‘prove’ 
from documents or declarations that these schools have existed throughout US history, nor does 
he argue that these schools coincide with particular political parties. He is not attempting to 
build a theory of state action or foreign relations, and the general nature of his categories is 
certain to be criticised by historians and political scientists alike. But for the purposes of our 
exercise, his approach can help us think more clearly about the domestic sources of American 
conduct abroad, and in turn about the question of the US as a ‘normative power’.
6  
As we shall see, the similarities and differences between these approaches do not allow us to 
align them along either a simple conservative-liberal or isolationist-internationalist spectrum. 
They also allow us to illuminate the often-bitter debates within the Democratic and Republican 
parties. In the following I draw on a variety of sources to explain and contrast these different 
approaches, but in general stick to Mead’s framework.  
2.1 Wilsonians 
Wilsonianism is grounded in two basic notions. The first is that democracies are more likely 
than others to develop fair and effective legal systems, and thus make better and more reliable 
partners than monarchies or autocracies. The domestic character of countries is a major 
determinant of national behaviour and hence, world peace. The second premise is that the 
United States is a nation set apart by its values and principles from the rest of the world, and 
thus has both a moral duty and a practical need to spread democracy to the ends of the earth. 
                                                      
5 Throughout this section I draw closely on Mead, to whom I am indebted. While Mead’s basic 
framework is particularly useful for this exercise, he is not alone in arguing that different traditions 
compete for the privilege of directing American foreign policy. For other perspectives of differing 
American approaches, see McDougall (1997); Nau (2002); Binnendijk & Kugler (2007). 
6 According to Mead, “the four schools are definite and distinct entities, but they change over time, they 
mix and blur, and most important, they are part of a political history of ideas. They are movements and 
communities of interest and feeling rather than abstract principles. They are churches rather than creeds”. 
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Wilson believed strongly that the “force of America is the force of moral principle” and that the 
“idea of America is to serve humanity”. Long before he became president, Wilson wrote of his 
conviction that the United States had a “plain destiny [to] serve [rather than] subdue the world”. 
Later, as president, he would contend that this destiny to serve was the only possible motivation 
for American actions in the world.  
The Wilsonian belief that the cause of peace can and should be advanced through the spread of 
democratic values and institutions leads them to interventionist policies, reflected in Wilson’s 
famous statement:  
We are glad…to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its 
peoples…for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to 
choose their way of life and of obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy. Its 
peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty.
7 
Wilson was not averse to using force to advance his vision. To help other peoples become, in 
his opinion, more democratic and orderly, Wilson sent American troops twice into Mexico, to 
Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Cuba, and maintained US military ‘protection’ of Nicaragua. 
He also intervened militarily twice in the Russian civil war. Wilson best expressed his attitude 
toward such interventions in 1914: “[T]hey say the Mexicans are not fitted for self-government 
and to this I reply that, when properly directed, there is no people not fitted for self-
government.” When Wilson finally made the decision to enter World War I in April 1917, he 
again justified his action in highly idealistic terms that enabled the American people to come to 
regard the war as a crusade to “make the world safe for democracy.” 
While Wilsonians have not hesitated to advance normative goals through non-normative means, 
one can point to at least three broad areas in which Wilsonian tradition has led the US to act as a 
normative power.  
First, Wilsonians look – with some justice – to the development and expansion of a democratic 
Atlantic community as vindication of their approach. In this cause they aligned with the 
Hamiltonian school, described below. Second, Wilsonians have been determined opponents of 
colonialism. This is a chequered history, of course, but in many instances US determination to 
advance decolonisation against some of its closest allies aligned the US with the rise to 
independence and development of growing portions of the non-European world.  Third, the 
Wilsonian tradition has been a leading force in international efforts to prevent war, including 
through codes of conduct and arms control; and in efforts to develop alternatives to war, for 
instance through the development of arbitration treaties and of international organisations for 
collective security such as the League of Nations, the World Court and the United Nations. 
Much leadership in these areas has been European, but American Wilsonians have participated 
and often been successful in securing US government support for these and other initiatives, 
driven by their conviction that multilateral organisations and international regimes can extend 
such bedrock American values as respect for the rule of law, due process and human rights.
8  
Of course, the US does not always conduct its foreign policy along Wilsonian lines. Sometimes 
other currents have subverted Wilsonian efforts; at other times they have amplified them. This 
                                                      
7 Cited in Nathan & Oliver (1976, p. 21). 
8 For non-US affirmation of this role, see Thakur & Sidhu (2006, p. 8). Henry Kissinger, realist par 
excellence, once noted with some personal chagrin that, “[I]t is above all to the drumbeat of Wilsonian 
idealism that American foreign policy has marched since his watershed presidency, and continues to 
march to this day…. Wilson’s historic achievement lies in his recognition that Americans cannot sustain 
major international obligations that are not justified by their moral faith.” See Kissinger (1994, pp. 30 and 
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can lead the US to appear as a world-class hypocrite. “Wilsonians proclaim noble principles and 
sincerely plan to apply them”, Mead (2002, p. 171) notes, “but then, alas, they sometimes lose 
policy battles. The Clinton administration extended most favoured nation status to China despite 
the country’s un-Wilsonian approach to human rights. The United States fell far behind in its 
UN dues, despite the fervent lobbying of its Wilsonian friends.” 
In short, the Wilsonian tradition has employed both normative and non-normative means to 
advance what its adherents consider to be quintessentially normative goals, and with highly 
uneven results. As Mead (2002, p. 38) notes, there is much in the Wilsonian school that makes 
foreign and domestic actors uncomfortable, particularly the insistence that “the United States 
has the right and the duty to change the rest of the world’s behaviour, and that the United States 
can and should concern itself not only with the way other countries conduct their international 
affairs, but with their domestic policies as well”.
9 
Yet US support for the Wilsonian ideal has won tolerance, support and sympathy for US 
influence and power, and has prompted nations and progressive elements in many societies to 
identify with this ideal and to seek closer ties with Americans. “How useful it is”, Mead (2002, 
p. 171) concludes, that “so many people around the world see Wilsonian ideals as defining the 




The Hamiltonian school is named for Alexander Hamilton, the nation’s first Secretary of the 
Treasury and a co-author of the Federalist Papers. Hamiltonians believe that the United States 
has a profound interest in maintaining a relatively open, international and largely maritime 
trading and financial order. Hamiltonians readily speak of the ‘national interest’ and ‘the 
balance of power’, and while they would fit most readily in the ‘realist’ category, their 
motivations and approaches should not be mistaken for Continental European realism. 
Hamiltonians view open international commerce, framed by a predictable world order based on 
international law, as a potential cause of peace. These beliefs have led Hamiltonians to 
champion US efforts to ensure freedom of the seas, freedom of the skies, an open door for 
American goods, open access to supplies of strategic materials and an international legal and 
financial order that permits the broadest possible global trade in capital and goods. While some 
observers might relegate such aims to the category of ‘possession goals’, this tradition most 
assuredly considers such objectives as ‘milieu goals’. 
Throughout much of US history, these goals appeared to be protected by the British Empire. 
The collapse of the Empire led Hamiltonians to believe it was incumbent upon the United States 
to replace Great Britain as the ‘gyroscope’ of an economically-oriented world order that could 
circumvent the zero-sum problem that condemns purely security-based systems to endless bouts 
of war and revisionism. Hamiltonians did not hesitate to build strong military forces and 
international security alliances to protect US interests in the emerging cold war, of course, but 
equally important in their mind was a global economic system resting primarily on the free 
participation of independent states. Together with Wilsonians, they set out to create a set of 
international institutions that would ‘civilise’ policies around the world, particularly in Europe. 
The result, John Ikenberry (2004) argues, was an “‘American system’ organized around a dense 
array of rules, institutions, and partnerships spread across global and regional security, 
economic and political realms. It has been an order built on ‘liberal hegemonic’ bargains, 
                                                      
9 See also Eichenberg (2005, pp. 140-177), Kull (2003) and Drezner (2007).  
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diffuse reciprocity, public goods provision, and an unprecedented array of intergovernmental 
institutions and working relationships.” 
This approach survived the cold war period. George H.W. Bush is a classic Hamiltonian. While 
Bush Senior rejected much of the Wilsonian credo as dangerous and illusory, he understood that 
a more cohesive democratic community could advance not only American ideals but also 
American interests. Even before the Berlin Wall fell, Bush argued that the West had to move 
beyond a grand strategy “based on the concept of containment” of communism, to encourage a 
“growing community of democracies anchoring international peace and stability, and a dynamic 
free-market system generating prosperity and progress on a global scale”.
11  
Bill Clinton picked up the challenge, creating the Asia-Pacific Economic Community and 
advancing most-favoured-nation status for China; securing US support for the creation of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO); and ensuring ratification of the Uruguay Round of 
multilateral free trade negotiations and the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
Although this order has been challenged and weakened during the presidency of George W. 
Bush, it has proved its resilience in the face of considerable dispute and largely continues today. 
In this system, interests and norms cannot easily be separated. Building up institutions after the 
Second World War was a projection of American norms, but it also safeguarded American 
interests (Cox, 2003, p. 9). In Wolfers’ terms, for many decades the milieu goal of an open 
international order coincided in significant ways with the possession goal of safeguarding 
American interests. 
Hamiltonians continue to join with Wilsonians to believe that international cooperation is 
necessary to meet today’s challenges – whether it is the fight against terrorists, curtailing 
weapons proliferation, curbing the spread of deadly diseases, or containing global warming. 
Such cooperation, they believe, is more likely to be available and effective if it is regularised 
within an institutional setting and according to agreed rules and procedures. While Wilsonians 
would insist that such cooperation could only be sustained with other democracies, 
Hamiltonians are more willing to work on common goals with undemocratic regimes as well, if 
such cooperation is necessary to advance a particular objective. 
The alliance between Hamiltonians and Wilsonians has been a powerful force in US foreign 
policy, but it has not always carried the day. At times the two schools have split, and at times 
two other schools have succeeded in blunting Hamiltonian-Wilsonian projects.
12  
2.3 Jeffersonians 
This school is named after Thomas Jefferson, 3
rd President of the United States and principal 
author of the Declaration of Independence. Jeffersonians have often opposed both Hamiltonian 
and Wilsonian policy because they believe the most vital interest of the American people is to 
protect and develop democracy at home. “Like Wilsonians”, says Mead, “Jeffersonians believe 
that the American Revolution continues.” Whereas Hamiltonians believe that the United States 
is a country that once had a revolution, Wilsonians and Jeffersonians believe that America 
                                                      
11 The Hamiltonian-Wilsonian alliance continued into the Clinton Administration. Bill Clinton, who more 
comfortably fits the Wilsonian creed, made the enlargement of the community of free-market 
democracies a central tenet of his foreign policy, and was able to secure Hamiltonian support, particularly 
within the Republican Party, for important elements of this approach. 
12 Samuel Berger (2004, p. 50) has characterised domestic struggles over foreign policy broadly as “a 
battle fought between liberal internationalists in both parties who believe that our strength is usually 
greatest when we work in concert with allies in defense of our shared values and interests, versus those 
who seem to believe that the United States should go it alone – or not go it at all”. 10 | DANIEL S. HAMILTON 
 
remains a revolutionary country (Mead, 2002, p. 178). Rather than act on the Wilsonians’ 
almost missionary impulse to promote democratic revolutions abroad, however, Jeffersonians 
believe that America is best suited to be an exemplar for others by fulfilling the democratic 
promise of its revolution at home. Jeffersonians are preoccupied with the gap between American 
aspirations and American achievements. They believe that liberty, while precious, is fragile, and 
could be subverted as easily from within as from without. They are concerned, in Mead’s words 
(2002, p. 185), that “excessive intervention in the Hobbesian world of international politics 
would corrupt and undermine the Lockean, democratic order that the American people had 
established at home”, and so support a limited foreign policy that defines US interests as 
narrowly as possible. 
Foreign observers may characterise this school as isolationist, but for the purposes of this 
exercise it is important to recognise that this movement is not simply a knee-jerk impulse, born 
out of a sense of US invulnerability, but derives rather from a profound concern about the 
vulnerability of American norms and values to the consequences of developments abroad. 
“Whatever America hopes to bring to pass in the world”, Dwight D. Eisenhower admonished, 
“must first come to pass in the heart of America.”
13  
Jeffersonians do not oppose peaceful commercial relations and mutually beneficial interactions 
with other nations, but they insist that the priority of Americans must be to build a model 
society that others might emulate, rather than to invest inordinate energy and resources on 
imposing American ways on nations with different histories and traditions. Jeffersonians fear 
excessive concentration of economic, military or potential power domestically as well as 
internationally. They believe that breathless talk of spreading liberty, democracy, freedom of 
speech, civil rights and civil society abroad ignores the daily reality that such principles are 
honoured in the breach by racial segregation or discrimination against Americans and others at 
home. They embrace America’s system of checks and balances, constitutional restrictions on 
excessive power and the role of the Congress in foreign policy.  
The Jeffersonian tradition is important for our discussion because it refutes the premise asserted 
by Thomas Diez, in his debates with Ian Manners about ‘normative power’, that the US lacks a 
tradition of self-reflection that Diez considers to be an important component of such power. At 
its core, the Jeffersonian school represents precisely such a tradition, one ever on its guard 
against abuse of power, investigating and often controverting claims made by Wilsonian and 
Hamiltonian activists.  
During the early years following World War II, Jeffersonians fought unsuccessfully against 
Hamiltonian-Wilsonian efforts to build the post-war international order. While their influence 
was muted during the early years of the cold war, they enjoyed a certain revival in the wake of 
Vietnam and again after the cold war. Jeffersonians pushed through the War Powers Act and the 
Freedom of Information Act, and have been consistent supporters of efforts to subject executive 
branch intelligence and military agencies to constant and rigorous congressional oversight. They 
have joined with Wilsonians to limit arms, and they share Wilsonian abhorrence at US 
activities, such as treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib or Guantanamo Bay, because they 
represent Executive branch violations of the cherished American principle of rule of law. 
Jeffersonian opposition to fast-track trade authority is often viewed abroad as a sign of 
isolationalism, protectionism or of US efforts to exempt itself from international treaties, but 
this stance more directly reflects Jeffersonian concerns about the constitutional integrity of 
congressional authority over trade and the norms of American democracy. 
                                                      
13 Eisenhower could not be classified as a Jeffersonian, but he did have a keen sense of the limits of 
American power, was cautious about excessive concentration of power at home and understood that such 
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In short, Jeffersonians are not without influence. In the person of Ralph Nader, Jeffersonians 
arguably torpedoed Al Gore’s bid for the Presidency in 2000, and in so doing paved the way for 
George W. Bush. Yet Jeffersonians have been vociferous opponents of the ‘war on terrorism’, 
fearful of its expansive connotations and its impact on civil liberties, and wondering, in Michael 
Ignatieff’s words (2003a), whether via its actions the nation “risks losing its soul as a republic”. 
John Quincy Adams's warning of 1821 is emblazoned upon the efforts of present-day 
Jeffersonians: Americans should resist the temptation of going abroad “in search of monsters to 
destroy”, he cautioned, for if America were seduced into becoming “the dictatress of the world, 
she would be no longer the ruler of her own spirit.”'
14 
2.4 Jacksonians 
The Jacksonian tradition, named for Andrew Jackson, the country’s seventh President, 
represents less an intellectual or political movement than an expression of the social, cultural 
and religious culture of a large portion of the American public. Unlike the other schools, which 
are rooted in a civic identity grounded in principles of democracy and the rule of law, 
Jacksonian tradition is rooted in a ‘folkish’ or populist community of national experiences – 
close to what could be termed a national ethnic identity, except that Jacksonians, too, have 
opened to different ethnic, religion and other groupings. 
Jacksonians assert that the prime goal of US domestic and foreign policy must be the physical 
security and economic prosperity of the American people. They are instinctively democratic and 
populist, skeptical of domestic or foreign ‘do-gooding’ (welfare at home, foreign aid abroad), 
mistrustful of federal authority but supportive of a strong military and fond of federal support 
for the middle class, and deeply attached to the Bill of Rights – particularly the Second 
Amendment and the right to bear arms as the ‘citadel of liberty’. (Mead, 2002, p. 225). 
Jacksonians believe the world is and will remain violent and dangerous; Americans must remain 
vigilant and well- armed. Like Jeffersonians, Jacksonians prefer selective or limited engagement 
with the outside world. But when engaged or enraged, they are ruthless, and offer no quarter. 
Jacksonians are often obstructionists in foreign policy. Jacksonians led by Senator Robert Taft 
opposed the formation of NATO and the permanent deployment of troops to Europe, believing 
that the US could and should have relied on the unilateral exercise of military power to defeat 
Soviet designs. They fought the creation of the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund and abhor the UN. They are wary of trade liberalisation and economic interdependence, 
which could imply greater vulnerability and loss of economic autonomy. 
Jacksonians are the least likely to support Wilsonian initiatives for a better world, have the least 
regard for international law and practice, are least tolerant of Jeffersonian calls for restrictions 
on US power, and are the least willing to support Hamiltonian strategies of balanced 
engagement. For most foreigners continental Jacksonians are the most deplored school. As 
Mead (2002, p. 225) notes, “Jacksonian chairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee are 
the despair of high-minded people everywhere as they hold up American adherence to the 
Kyoto Protocol, starve the UN and the IMF, cut foreign aid, and ban the use of American funds 
for population control programs abroad.” Jacksonians readily fit foreign stereotypes of US 
foreign policy as an unhealthy and dangerous mix of ignorance, isolationism and ‘cowboy 
diplomacy’. Jacksonian influence has tended to centre in the Congress rather than the Executive 
branch, but has enjoyed considerable influence during the administration of George W. Bush. 
                                                      
14 John Quincy Adams, while Secretary of State under President James Monroe, in a speech before the US 
House of Representatives in honour of Independence Day in 1821 (excerpt at 
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2.5  Assessing the Four Schools 
If one were to characterise recent US presidencies in terms of these four approaches, one would 
say that the George H.W. Bush administration was uniformly composed of Hamiltonians; that 
the Clinton Administration was an uneasy blend of liberal Wilsonians, Jeffersonians and 
Hamiltonians; and that the presidency of George W. Bush began as an amalgam of 
Jeffersonians, neo-conservative Wilsonians and Jacksonians. George W. Bush came to office 
proclaiming such Jeffersonian themes as the need for ‘selective engagement’ and a ‘humble’ 
foreign policy, but notably excluded many Hamiltonians, who were the legacy of his father’s 
administration – people such as Brent Scowcroft and James Baker, who were anathema to 
George Junior. Before the new administration could articulate its particular approach to foreign 
policy, however, the attacks of September 11 empowered the neo-conservative Wilsonians, 
enraged the Jacksonians and silenced the Jeffersonians, resulting in an historical anomaly – an 
alliance of Wilsonians and Jacksonians. The next US administration is likely to offer a different 
blend of traditions.  
These four schools compete to shape the direction of US foreign policy. Each has significant 
weight in American debates. Each views foreign policy primarily as an extension of its domestic 
political orientation. Each has held sway at particular points in American history, but policies 
that have proven to be sustainable have typically needed support from two if not three of the 
schools. They are not neat and tidy categories; there is considerable overlap between them. But 
together they can serve as a general guide to help illuminate the sources of American conduct in 
the world.  
Although each of these schools offers a different approach to US foreign policy, they are united 
by a common belief in American exceptionalism and the transformative power of America. 
“From the start”, Daniel Bell (1989) notes, “Americans have believed that destiny has marked 
their country as different from others – that the United States is, in Lincoln's marvellous phrase, 
‘an almost chosen nation’.” Throughout American history, exceptionalist belief has framed the 
discourse of foreign policy-making by providing the underlying assumptions and terms of 
reference for foreign policy debate and conduct (Lepgold & McKeown, 1995).  
What are often interpreted as lusty swings between internationalism and isolationism are 
perhaps better understood as competition and shifting alliances among these competing schools 
over the most appropriate way to express their shared belief in American exceptionalism. 
Thomas Diez and Ian Manners (2007) point explicitly to this common belief in American 
exceptionalism as reason to question whether the US could in fact be considered a ‘normative 
power’ – another element to consider in our case studies. 
3. Case  Studies 
With this as a background, let us now examine US foreign policy through the categories set 
forth by Tocci. Since an individual case study cannot convey the weight any particular approach 
may have within broader currents of policy, I have also offered in each category other possible 
examples as food for thought.  THE UNITED STATES: A NORMATIVE POWER? | 13 
 
Table 1. US case studies 
Normative  Realpolitik  Imperial Status  quo 













































3.1 Normative  Intended:  Creating the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism, 1995-2007 
When has the US acted in ways that could be characterised as ‘normative intended’, i.e. when 
has it pursued milieu goals aimed at strengthening international legality and institutions in ways 
that have respected its own domestic laws as well as its international legal obligations, and did 
this effort truly have a normative impact and be perceived by its recipients as such? This is a 
tough standard to meet, but one can find a number of cases in which US action can be so 
characterised.  
I have chosen to highlight US leadership in creating the World Trade Organisation, particularly 
its dispute settlement mechanism, in part to challenge passing references that consider open 
commercial activities as a possession goal rather than as a milieu goal. When it comes to setting 
forth a structure and rules for international trade, milieu goals can be paramount. This case also 
addresses a second important question in the debate about normative power, i.e. whether the US 
is really willing to be bound by international law.   
Narrative 
Interest in establishing a predictable open international economic order led to US support in 
1995 for two related initiatives: a more formal treaty-based organisation, the World Trade 
Organisation, to replace the looser General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) created 
after World War II; and a relatively binding trade dispute settlement mechanism under the new 
multilateral system.  
As the world’s leading economy, the US has an interest in widely shared rules and procedures 
that can underpin a stable, non-discriminatory trading order. To ensure the commitment of other 
governments, the US needed to establish its reliability and commit itself to be bound by the 
same rules and obligations. A procedure for settling disputes existed under the old GATT, but it 
had no fixed timetables, rulings were easier to block, and many cases dragged on for a long time 
inconclusively. Frustration with the GATT led the US to seek enforceable multilateral rules. 
The WTO oversees about 60 different agreements with the status of international legal texts that 
are binding on its 151 member states. Since the creation of the dispute settlement mechanism, 
the United States has been the most engaged WTO member, both bringing cases and complying 
with cases it has lost.
15 
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Goals, means and impact  
The goal of the US effort to create the WTO and its dispute settlement mechanism was to 
establish a rules-based, multilateral organisation obliging all member nations, including the 
United States, to conform to predictable trading relationships, as outlined in WTO statutes. The 
means consisted of a negotiating effort to replace the loophole-ridden GATT with a formal 
institution under international law. The result requires sustained cooperation from member 
states. While the WTO’s mandate to negotiate further liberalisation of trade via the Doha Round 
continues to be a struggle, the dispute settlement mechanism is respected and continues to work 
as an arbiter of trade disputes, offering an alternative to costly trade wars. Without a means of 
settling disputes, the rules-based system would be less effective because the rules could not be 
enforced. The WTO’s procedure underscores the rule of law, affirms the principle that trade 
must be non-discriminatory, and makes the trading system more secure and predictable. The 
WTO not only ensures open markets for the United States, it exerts pressure on the US to keep 
its own market open. When any nation, including the United States, is found to have violated 
WTO statutes, there are provisions for redress. While there is room for improvement in ensuring 
compliance, transparency and accessibility, the system has worked reasonably well. Despite 
continuing debates about the WTO in many countries, the fact that 151 nations have ratified 
their membership, bring cases to the WTO for resolution and largely comply with its judgments 
must be seen as a significant milieu achievement and as a positive contribution to international 
law and institutions. 
The dispute settlement system has reduced the need for the United States or others, including 
the EU, to resort to unilateral retaliatory measures. Since the advent of the dispute settlement 
system, the United States has generally abided by its agreement not to impose unilateral trade 
sanctions against WTO members without WTO authorisation. Moreover, the US has respected 
WTO decisions against it – recent examples include US removal of steel tariffs and 
abandonment of safeguard measures in three other areas, all in response to losses at the WTO.  
Conditioning factor: Domestic context 
It is perhaps useful to note that while the US helped to create the WTO as a full-fledged 
international institution, US opposition to a similar status for the WTO’s predecessor, the 
GATT, was the primary reason the post-war international trade regime remained relatively 
weak. In December 1945, at US initiative, major trading countries entered into negotiations to 
conclude a multilateral agreement for the reciprocal reduction of tariffs on trade in goods. 
Moreover, the US prompted the UN to adopt a resolution in February 1946, to begin efforts to 
create the charter of an International Organisation for Trade (ITO), which was agreed in 
October 1947. The ITO Charter, however, never entered into force. Jeffersonians and 
Jacksonians argued successfully that the new organisation would intrude on domestic economic 
issues, and in December 1950, President Truman announced that he would no longer seek 
Congressional approval of the ITO Charter.  
Over time, however, the lack of agreed-upon enforcement procedures under the GATT 
generated considerable US frustration. Hamiltonians and Wilsonians joined together to advance 
US support for the dispute settlement mechanism, united in the belief that free trade and open 
markets would not just promote economic prosperity, but could promote democracy and 
mitigate bitter conflicts with key trading partners, which also happened to be America’s closest 
allies. According to this view, open markets tend to open societies, liberalise politics and 
integrate and socialise nations into a predictable order. To achieve this goal, the US would also 
need to commit itself to the dispute settlement mechanism, and thus its possession goals and 
milieu goals were mutually reinforcing.  THE UNITED STATES: A NORMATIVE POWER? | 15 
 
In this second try at a stronger trade regime, neither Jeffersonians nor Jacksonians carried 
enough weight in the Congress or in the Executive to challenge the effort. Domestic critics, 
reflecting both Jacksonian and Jeffersonian perspectives, continue to charge that the WTO is an 
intrusion on US sovereignty. Supporters underscore that that in the end, the WTO panels have 
no power to order any member to change its laws, or to impose retaliation, but that the US 
decision to join the WTO and abide by its procedures is itself an exercise of sovereignty.  
Conditioning factor: Capabilities 
As we examine the question to what degree the US can be a normative actor, a key underlying 
issue in each of these cases is the relationship between norms and power. To what degree are the 
normative intended results due to US power to shape outcomes? Is it necessary to have 
significant capability to set a norm, i.e. can only major powers be normative in terms of results? 
In her introductory essay, Nathalie Tocci (2007) states that “our definition of what is normative, 
rather than being a pure expression of power, must undertake the function of ‘taming’ and 
regulating power”. 
As the world’s largest economy and champion of the rules-based post-war international 
economic order, the US clearly possessed significant ‘shaping power’ to advance this ‘milieu 
goal’ of establishing the WTO and its dispute settlement mechanism. In fact, the US position 
was enhanced by its argument that unless an effective international enforcement procedure 
could be created, the Congress would continue to insist upon unilateral remedies against what it 
deemed to be ‘unfair’ trade practices by other countries.
16 Yet while US leadership proved 
essential, it is not evident that the final result was engineered by the US to serve its national 
interests at the expense of others. If the WTO was viewed solely as an instrument of US power, 
it is unlikely that 150 other nations would have joined, taking steps to secure domestic 
ratification of their own membership, or that others still seek to join. Moreover, the US has been 
playing by the rules and has agreed to be bound by WTO judgments in cases it has lost.
17 In all 
of these senses, then, US normative action was able to ‘tame’ and ‘regulate’ power. 
Conditioning factor: External context 
As outlined above, by the 1980s the weaknesses of the GATT had become apparent to most 
trading countries, and there was general consensus on the need for an overhaul of the regime. 
While the US joined with most other major trading countries to advance the negotiations leading 
to the WTO, it is perhaps interesting for the purposes of our exercise to note that the initial 
negotiations pitted US advocacy for a strong legal model that stressed adjudication against EU 
and Japanese advocacy for what William J. Davey (1993) has termed an “anti-legalistic” model 
emphasising negotiation and consensus. In the end, the EU and Japan apparently persuaded 
themselves that the risk of US unilateral action was a greater danger than a demanding 
                                                      
16 Innumerable bilateral conflicts with the European Union over its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
and with Japan over its closed market in the 1970s and 1980s led the US to pass laws such as Section 301 
of the Trade Act of 1974 and the Super 301 provisions of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 
1988, which sought to remove ‘unreasonable and unjustifiable’ barriers to US exports by threatening 
unilateral trade sanctions. While these measures met with mixed results, they did help convince other 
countries of the merits of establishing a more effective system at the WTO (see Lawrence, 2007). 
17 While Beth Simmons cautions that even though “much international behavior is consistent with 
international law…it has been far more difficult…to show any causal link between legal commitments 
and behavior”. An investigation of 984 US antidumping investigations, supplemented by 2,748 potential 
cases never initiated, from 1978 through 2002, however, makes it clear that the US is less likely to 
investigate and impose unilateral antidumping duties against members of the WTO. See Simmons (1998) 
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international legal system governing trade (Hudec, 1993, p. 237). Here then, we find that the 
threat of US unilateral action, born of frustration with weak or ineffective multilateral 
arrangements, can in fact galvanise action to strengthen rules-based international mechanisms. 
Summary 
How representative are these examples of the US acting as a normative power? Other examples 
certainly could be cited, including the creation of the World Bank and the IMF; the Marshall 
Plan or President Eisenhower’s push for the creation of the International Development 
Association (IDA) facility to helping the poorest of nations; the creation of the Peace Corps; the 
formation of APEC, the OAS and NAFTA; the Camp David Agreement; brokering the 1998 
Ecuador-Peru peace treaty; US support for and active engagement in the Stability Pact for the 
Balkans following the Kosovo conflict; creation with others of the Lyon Group, the Financial 
Action Task Force, the Egmont group, and other ‘international non-organisations’ and ‘name 
and shame’ activities that support new international norms against drug trafficking, human 
trafficking and terrorist financing; the 1967 Outer Space Treaty; creating the Community of 
Democracies; creation of the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Container Security 
Initiative; and the Nunn-Lugar Program to dismantle nuclear weapons and to provide assistance 
to a variety of states, including Russia, in defence conversion, export control, housing for 
demobilised military personnel and environmental restoration. The US has ratified a variety of 
international treaties, such as the Genocide Convention (1989), the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (1992) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (1994). Recent examples include creation of the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation to assist the poorest nations of the world; the President’s Malaria Initiative; the 
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative for relief to the world’s poorest, most heavily indebted 
nations; and the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and Tuberculosis.  
In addition, the US has been the most active, and most actively requested, mediator of 
international conflicts since 1945 (Touval, 1992; Crocker et al., 1999). Moreover, there are 
various examples of mediation efforts by actors other than the US that do not come to closure 
until the US itself engages or demonstrates its support for those mediation efforts. Examples 
include Bosnia, Sudan, Jordan and Mozambique. Bosnia is a particularly striking example when 
it comes to notions of the EU as a ‘normative power’. As Richard Holbrooke has commented, it 
is absurd that inter-European squabbling and impotence required America to broker the peace 
agreement for Bosnia, particularly when in 1991 (in echoes of ‘normative power Europe’) 
Jacques Poos, the foreign minister of Luxembourg, declared: “This is the hour of Europe, not 
the hour of the Americans.” 
Finally, US cases raise the question whether legitimacy derives from norms developed by 
sovereign states, some of which may be odious, or from other principles, such as democracy. 
The first would make the imprimatur of the UN the test of legitimacy; the second would argue 
that support from the democratic community is a better test. US proposals leading to the 
creation of the Community of Democracies in the Clinton administration, and the current 
proposal by Republican presidential candidate John McCain for a League of Democracies, are 
examples of this normative thrust in US policy. 
In these and many other areas, the US has advanced normative goals through normative means 
with largely normative results. Such efforts on the whole have strengthened international law 
and institutions and promoted rights and duties enshrined and specified in international law, 
including the rights and duties of the US itself. They highlight the fact that at times the US 
functions as a ‘norm entrepreneur’.  
Nathalie Tocci and her colleagues have offered EU enlargement as an example in this category. 
Doesn’t the continuing enlargement of NATO belong here as well? It strengthens an THE UNITED STATES: A NORMATIVE POWER? | 17 
 
international institution linked to the UN system; it is implemented through a treaty process 
ratified through parliamentary means in the US, all allied states and the accession states; it is 
certainly perceived by the ‘recipients’ of membership as an enhancement of their stability and 
anchoring of their democracy; and it reinforces a particular set of norms, such as civilian control 
of the military, that ground European and transatlantic security. It is certainly not perceived as 
normative by Russia. But I would argue not only that it is normative, but that it has been critical 
to the EU’s own ‘normative’ enlargement. More on this later.  
3.2  Normative unintended: US sanctions and targeted assistance 
regarding Belarus 
In her introductory essay, Nathalie Tocci poses a basic question for our exercise: under similar 
conditions, do different international actors opt for similar or different foreign policy 
approaches? More specifically, under similar conditions, do the EU and the US act in similar or 
dissimilar ways? In direct response to Tocci’s question, I have chosen to examine the same 




Following the election of President Aleksander Lukashenko in 1994, Belarus saw a rapid rise in 
authoritarianism and a subsequent decline in democratic freedoms and civil liberties. Under 
Lukashenko’s rule, political repression in Belarus has been rampant: several of Lukashenko’s 
political opponents have disappeared, others have been jailed, and political activists and NGOs 
face constant harassment. Mass gatherings are illegal without consent from the government. In 
response, the US has worked closely with the EU to impose an incremental series of sanctions 
and targeted assistance tailored to support democracy for the people of Belarus while punishing 
the regime for its abuses.
19 
Goals, means and impact  
The goal of US policy – to support initiatives that have the potential to advance democracy and 
the rule of law in Belarus – is certainly normative. The US has also employed normative means 
to advance this goal. Similar to EU efforts, US actions have been consistent, incremental and 
tailored in response to events in Belarus. The US and EU have coordinated their approaches, 
and have had the support of other international organisations and NGOs. US assistance 
programmes focus on human rights monitoring and education, independent trade unions, 
democratic political party and coalition development, voter education, strengthening civil 
society, rule of law, and electoral reform and monitoring, and has worked closely with EU 
partners in these areas. The US and the EU have also worked to highlight the Lukashenko 
regime’s abuses and to hold authorities accountable who are implicated in wrongdoing, for 
example, by imposing travel restrictions and investigating the sources of their assets. US 
officials are careful to stress that these sanctions are aimed at the regime rather than at the 
                                                      
18 As Tocci notes, time is a crucial determinant when considering such cases. For instance, the United 
States never recognised the incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union. This reflected in part 
principle, in part pressure from Baltic-American groupings at home, and in part a useful instrument to 
tweak the Soviets. But when the cold war ended, the US found itself, perhaps unexpectedly, on the ‘right 
side of history’ on this issue, and capitalised on it to advance Baltic integration into the West. What began 
as a ‘normative unintended’ example perhaps became a ‘normative intended’ example.  
19 For an overview, see Hamilton & Mangott (2007). 18 | DANIEL S. HAMILTON 
 
people of Belarus. US efforts appear to have had little effect, however, in advancing the 
normative goal of greater democracy in Belarus.  
Conditioning factor: Domestic context 
The US has few if any possession goals regarding Belarus; the milieu goal of a continent of 
democracies governed by the rule of law has far higher precedence. The issue is remote enough 
not to stir Jeffersonians or Jacksonians. It is marginal to Hamiltonians, and so the field has been 
left to Wilsonian activists. Such activism alone, however, is not sufficient to truly drive the US 
to higher-profile or more energetic activities, despite the relative ineffectiveness of current 
approaches.  
Conditioning factor: Capabilities 
While the US is a major economic power, its capability to affect Belarus through economic 
sanctions is limited because of the limited commercial relationship between the two countries 
and the ability of Belarus to avail itself of other channels.  
Conditioning factor: External environment 
As with the EU, the US is unwilling to incur high costs to advance its approach to Belarus, 
particularly in relations with Russia. Moreover, Belarus has enjoyed a more beneficial economic 
and energy relationship with Russia than some of Russia’s other neighbours, and so the effects 
of sanctions have been limited.  
Politically, since its independence from the USSR, Belarus has retained close political and 
economic ties to Russia, with Moscow essentially financing the Belarus economy over the past 
decade and a half by providing energy and prices far below market rates. This situation changed 
dramatically in 2007, however, when Russia more than doubled the amount Belarus must pay 
for Russian natural gas, and forced Belarus to relinquish a 50% stake of its state-owned gas 
transport company, Beltranshaz, to Russia’s state-controlled gas monopoly Gazprom. 
Lukashenko now finds himself under intense pressure from both the West and the East, and the 
very basis of his regime’s stability – low oil and gas prices – is in danger. In such a context, 
current US and EU policies might carry additional bite.  
Summary 
Despite seeking normative goals through normative means, the US failed to achieve normative 
results through its approach to Belarus. The US has limited influence over Belarus, even after 
joining together with the EU. There is bipartisan yet relatively shallow support at home for 
vigorous US action, and US interests vis-à-vis Russia may mitigate the full impact of US policy 
on Belarus.  
How representative is this case for the US? Is the US often frustrated in its ability to advance 
normative ends through normative means? A number of other examples could be cited, for 
instance US sanctions against Myanmar; efforts to broker settlements in Darfur, Cyprus, the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Transniestria, Abkazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh; or US 
efforts to advance international efforts against corruption. The United States took a leading role 
in the writing of treaties such as the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact and the Human Rights Covenants. In the end, however, the US often recoils from adhering 
to the far-reaching obligations of such multilateral treaties. US engagement in the Korean War, 
sanctioned by the UN, could also be considered normative unintended, given the inconclusive 
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UN, is another example; it is listed here because of the continuing struggle there and the highly 
uncertain outcome.  
In short, the history of US foreign policy is littered with normative efforts that have been 
stymied or gone awry. Failure has had many fathers, but relatively weak US influence over 
conflicting parties, or US reluctance to engage fully due to other domestic or external 
considerations, has often played a part. Yet if one compares the relatively abundant, and in some 
cases, impressive list of successful normative initiatives outlined in the first case, one must 
conclude that the US serves regularly as a major ‘norm entrepreneur’ – at times with failure, but 
at other times with considerable success. Moreover, such efforts did not come to a wholesale 
end in some ‘golden age’ of American post-war enlightenment, as Ian Manners seems to 
suggest, but continue – albeit quite unevenly – today.  
3.3 Realpolitik  Intended:  US Policy towards Iraq, 1980-1984 
The US has also acted in ways that may be characterised as Realpolitik intended, i.e. it has 
deployed policy instruments to pursue possession goals with results that were neither normative 
nor intended to be. A particularly instructive example is offered by the approach of the Reagan 
administration toward Iraq between 1980 and 1984.   
Narrative 
Tensions between Iraq and Iran led Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein to attack Iran in September 
1980, believing he would secure a quick victory. In the end, the war lasted eight years.
20 The 
UN Security Council called for a ceasefire and for all member states to refrain from actions 
contributing in any way to the conflict's continuation. The Soviets, opposing the war, cut off 
arms exports to Iran and to its Iraqi ally (although arms deliveries resumed in 1982). In 1980 the 
US broke off diplomatic relations with Iran because of the Tehran embassy hostage crisis (Iraq 
had broken off ties with the US during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war).  
The US was officially neutral regarding the Iran-Iraq war, and claimed that it armed neither 
side. By mid-1982, however, Iraq was on the defensive, and the Reagan administration, having 
decided that an Iranian victory would not serve its interests, began supporting Iraq. The White 
House and State Department pressured the Export-Import Bank to provide Iraq with financing, 
to enhance its credit standing and enable it to obtain loans from other international financial 
institutions. The State Department removed Iraq from its list of states supporting international 
terrorism. The US Agriculture Department provided taxpayer-guaranteed loans for purchases of 
American commodities. Moreover, despite US official neutrality in the conflict, the Reagan 
administration secretly began to provide Iraq with intelligence and military support.
21  
During the conflict Iran accused Iraq of using chemical weapons. The Geneva Protocol requires 
that the international community respond to chemical warfare, but Iran was relatively isolated 
diplomatically and its accusations received little attention. In October 1983, Iran demanded a 
full UN Security Council investigation. The US had intelligence confirming Iran's accusations; 
                                                      
20 For a full account, see Battle (2003). Almost all of the primary documents cited here and included in 
the briefing book were obtained by the National Security Archive through the Freedom of Information 
Act and were published in 1995. 
21 Policy directives from President Reagan to this effect, including National Security Decision Directive 
(NSDD) 99, were prepared pursuant to his March 1982 National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM 4-
82) asking for a review of US policy towards the Middle East. For the documents, see Battle (2003). 20 | DANIEL S. HAMILTON 
 
internal documents described Iraq’s “almost daily” use of chemical weapons.
22 The intelligence 
indicated that Iraq used chemical weapons against Iranian forces, and, according to a November 
1983 memo, against “Kurdish insurgents” as well.
23 
The Reagan administration responded on 26 November 1983, with National Security Decision 
Directive (NSDD) 114, which called for heightened regional military cooperation to defend oil 
facilities and improvements to US military capabilities in the Persian Gulf. “Because of the real 
and psychological impact of a curtailment in the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf on the 
international economic system”, the Directive stated, “we must assure our readiness to deal 
promptly with actions aimed at disrupting that traffic.” It did not mention chemical weapons.
24  
In December 1983, Donald Rumsfeld (who at the time headed the multinational pharmaceutical 
company G.D. Searle & Co.) was dispatched as Presidential envoy to the Middle East, including 
Baghdad, where he met with Saddam. The two discussed regional issues of mutual interest, 
shared enmity towards Iran and Syria, and other issues, but Rumsfeld made no reference to 
chemical weapons. He also met with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. The two agreed that 
“the US and Iraq shared many common interests”, and Rumsfeld affirmed the Reagan 
administration’s “willingness to do more” regarding the Iran-Iraq war, but “made clear that our 
efforts to assist were inhibited by certain things that made it difficult for us, citing the use of 
chemical weapons, possible escalation in the Gulf, and human rights”.
25  
In mid-March 1984, the US publicly condemned Iraq's chemical weapons use, but discussions 
continued regarding Export-Import Bank credits to Iraq and US efforts to cut off arms exports to 
Iran. Although US policy still barred the export of US military equipment to Iraq, some was 
apparently provided. When asked whether the US conclusion that Iraq had used chemical 
weapons would have “any effect on US recent initiatives to expand commercial relationships 
with Iraq across a broad range, and also a willingness to open diplomatic relations”, the 
department's spokesperson said “No. I’m not aware of any change in our position. We’re 
interested in being involved in a closer dialogue with Iraq”.
26  
                                                      
22 See US Department of State, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs Information Memorandum from 
Jonathan T. Howe to George P. Shultz, “Iraq Use of Chemical Weapons”, 1 November 1983, reproduced  
in Battle (2003), which also notes: “We also know that Iraq has acquired a CW production capability, 
presumably from Western firms, including possibly a US foreign subsidiary.”  
23 Department of State, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Action 
Memorandum from Jonathan T. Howe to Lawrence S. Eagleburger, “Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons” 
[includes cables entitled “Deterring Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons” and “Background of Iraqi Use of 
Chemical Weapons”], 21 November 1983, reproduced in Battle (2003). 
24 National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 114) from Ronald W. Reagan, “US Policy toward the 
Iran-Iraq War”, 26 November 1983 (available in Battle, 2003). 
25 United States Embassy in United Kingdom Cable from Charles H. Price II to the Department of State, 
“Rumsfeld Mission: December 20 Meeting with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein”, 21 December 1983; 
United States Embassy in the United Kingdom Cable from Charles H. Price II to the Department of State, 
“Rumsfeld One-on-One Meeting with Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister”, 21 December 1983 (both available 
in Battle, 2003). 
26 During the spring of 1984, the US reconsidered policy for the sale of dual-use equipment to Iraq’s 
nuclear programme, and its “preliminary results favor[ed] expanding such trade to include Iraqi nuclear 
entities”. Department of State, Special Adviser to the Secretary on Nonproliferation Policy and Nuclear 
Energy Affairs Memorandum from Dick Gronet to Richard T. Kennedy, “US Dual-Use Exports to Iraq: 
Specific Actions” [includes document entitled “Dual Use Exports to Iraq” dated 27 April 1984], 9 May 
1984 (available at Battle, 2003). On 3 March, the State Department intervened to prevent a US company 
from shipping 22,000 pounds of phosphorous fluoride, a chemical weapons precursor, to Iraq (see Battle, 
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Iran had submitted a draft resolution asking the UN to condemn Iraq's chemical weapons use. 
The US delegate to the UN was instructed to lobby friendly delegations in order to obtain a 
general motion of ‘no decision’ on the resolution. If this was not achievable, the US delegate 
was to abstain on the issue. Iraq’s ambassador met with the US ambassador to the UN, Jeanne 
Kirkpatrick, and asked for ‘restraint’ in responding to the issue – as did the representatives of 
both France and Britain. On 30 March 1984, the Security Council issued a presidential 
statement condemning the use of chemical weapons, without naming Iraq as the offending 
party.  
On 5 April 1984, Ronald Reagan issued NSDD 139, codifying US determination to develop 
plans “to avert an Iraqi collapse”. Reagan’s Directive said that US policy required 
“unambiguous” condemnation of chemical warfare (without naming Iraq), while including the 
caveat that the US should “place equal stress on the urgent need to dissuade Iran from 
continuing the ruthless and inhumane tactics which have characterized recent offensives”. The 
Directive did not suggest that “condemning” chemical warfare required any hesitation about or 
modification of US support for Iraq.
27  
A State Department background paper dated 16 November 1984 said that Iraq had stopped 
using chemical weapons after a November 1983 démarche from the US, but had resumed their 
use in February 1984. On 26 November 1984, Iraq and the US restored diplomatic relations.  
Goals, means and impact 
The US was determined to use Iraq to prevent Iranian victory, as one means to stabilise the 
broader region and keep Middle Eastern oil flowing. Iraq’s possession and use of chemical 
weapons, both as part of the war and even on its own Kurdish citizens, was viewed as a 
potentially embarrassing public relations problem that complicated efforts to provide assistance 
to Iraq, but not as a barrier to doing business. Saddam’s repressive internal policies, though well 
known to the US at the time, did not figure in US internal directives or in discussions with Iraqi 
leaders. During this period US policy was able to ensure stalemate in the conflict and to blunt 
any international effort to condemn Iraq in such a way that it would be unable to prosecute the 
war or to hinder broader US objectives in the region. 
Conditioning factor: Domestic context 
Despite domestic concern about Iraqi use of chemical weapons, there was no significant 
pressure on the Reagan administration to toughen its largely rhetorical opposition to Iraqi 
actions. In the wake of the US Embassy hostage crisis in Tehran, US opinion leaders were 
fiercely opposed to actions that could enhance Iranian influence or capabilities in the area.  
Conditioning factor: Domestic capabilities 
Although constrained by US law in areas such as export-import loans, the administration did 
what it could to press for provision of such loans to Iraq, and where it had a freer hand, such as 
agricultural commodities, it acted with alacrity. It also made use of its considerable global 
capabilities to provide intelligence information to Saddam. The US had various tools at its 
disposal to stop Iraqi efforts, but made little to no avail of them. 
                                                      
27 National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 139) from Ronald W. Reagan, “Measures to Improve US 
Posture and Readiness to Respond to Developments in the Iran-Iraq War”, 5 April 1984 (available in 
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Conditioning factor: The external environment 
While opposed to taking sides in the Iran-Iraq conflict, other members of the Security Council 
did little to buck US efforts to water down Security Council condemnation of Iraqi possession 
and use of chemical weapons. The broader framework of the cold war and Western concerns 
about stability of oil flows blunted any meaningful opposition to US policy. The oil-rich Gulf 
states, concerned with Iranian resurgence, provided Iraq with significant financial assistance. 
Summary  
Given the strident moral rhetoric used by George W. Bush in the lead-up to the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq, US policy toward Saddam between 1980 and 1984 is a particularly striking example of 
American Realpolitik. How much weight can we assign to Realpolitik when considering US 
foreign policy?  
When discussing the issue, it is important to distinguish between ‘realism’, which more often 
than not means a pragmatic approach to policy choices, and Realpolitik, which is described by 
Tocci for the purposes of our exercise as a consciously non-normative pattern of behaviour, 
focused narrowly in terms of state interest and power, to the exclusion of other concerns. Much 
debate conflates the two terms; here I am focused on the latter.
28 
Other contemporary examples of US Realpolitik could include US support for energy-rich yet 
democratically dubious Middle East sheikdoms and Eurasian rulers. Cold war examples in this 
category could include support for unsavoury regimes on most continents of the earth, who in 
the jargon of the time “may have been SOBs, but at least they were our SOBs;” US policies in 
the Cuban missile crisis; covert support for the Taliban in their fight against the Soviets in 
Afghanistan; Kissinger’s ‘shuttle diplomacy’ after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, where he pushed 
the Israelis to partially withdraw from the Sinai in deference to political realities created by the 
oil crisis; the US tilt towards Pakistan in the South Asia crisis of 1971 (Gandhi, 2002); or 
Nixon’s turn to communist China in order to open a ‘new front’ in America’s competition with 
the Soviet Union. The United States has on various occasions supported autocracies through aid, 
trade, recognition and friendly diplomatic relations, because other US policy goals have 
outweighed the US penchant for promoting democracy and the rule of law. The Bush 
administration’s approach to General Musharraf’s rule in Pakistan is a prominent contemporary 
example.  
Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger are perhaps the most prominent adherents of American 
Realpolitik, but the examples cited above underscore that leaders of both parties have engaged 
in such practices, and on a relatively frequent basis.
29 Yet if one returns to the schools outlined 
in the first section of this study, when it comes to basic questions of principle, Kissingerian 
Realpolitik, in the continental European sense of the word, sits uneasily with the American body 
politic. It does not fit well with Hamiltonian predilections, much less Wilsonian aspirations, and 
Jacksonian America disparages the very type of power balancing that Henry Kissinger and other 
Realpolitiker advocate.  
On the other hand, a systematic analysis of public opinion survey data and empirical literature 
over three decades reveals that when it comes to specific cases, American public opinion is far 
more receptive to Realpolitik than would seem likely (Drezner, 2007). Although 72% of 
                                                      
28 For additional commentary, see Lind (2007), Mearsheimer (2001), Gilpin (1996) and Krasner (1983, 
pp. 335-339). 
29 Kissinger continues to advocate the necessity of great power balancing, but even he qualifies this as 
including principles such as legitimacy and shared values, and not only mechanical ‘equilibrium’ or 
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respondents in a recent poll agreed that “moral principles” should be the guiding light in US 
foreign policy, a more systematic look at polls also show that in specific instances Americans 
are prepared to make other choices (Council on Foreign Relations, 2004). Data from the 
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) polls on top foreign policy priorities over the 
past 30 years show that policies emphasising security and autonomy consistently earn more than 
60% public support, whereas liberal policy priorities, emphasising multilateralism, democracy 
and human rights consistently earn less than 50% support. The 2002 CCFR report concludes: 
“Most Americans want a foreign policy that pursues justice as well as security. But protection of 
one’s own security and well-being naturally comes first” (Bouton, 2002, p. 21). 
After surveying survey data, Daniel Drezner (2007) concludes that “Americans think like 
intuitive neo-realists – they prefer balancing against aggressive and rising powers”, and Andrew 
Kohut and Bruce Stokes (2006) observe: “If asked to choose, Americans prefer proactive, 
assertive unilateral action to multilateral efforts beset by delay and compromise.” Indeed, 
Americans still favour reserving the right to use pre-emptive military force to a much greater 
extent than Europeans. Kohut and Stokes conclude: “In case after case, Americans are 
multilateralists in principle and unilateralists in practice.” 
3.4  Realpolitik Unintended: The US and the International Criminal Court, 
2002-07 
The US has also acted in ways that may be characterised as Realpolitik unintended, i.e. it has 
pursued non-normative goals in ways that have actually served to achieve an entrenchment and 
development of international law and institutions. The US approach to the International 
Criminal Court is a prominent contemporary example.  
Narrative 
The International Criminal Court (ICC), established in 2002, is the first global permanent 
international court with jurisdiction to prosecute individuals for “the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community”.
30 The United States initially supported the idea of 
creating an international criminal court and was a major participant at the Rome Conference 
forging the Rome Statute, its founding treaty. President Clinton signed the Statute in 2000, but 
declared that it contained “significant flaws” and indicated that he would not submit it to 
ratification “until our fundamental concerns are satisfied”. In May 2002, the Bush 
administration informed the United Nations that it did not intend to submit the treaty for 
ratification, and renounced any obligations under the treaty. Subsequent US efforts to qualify 
the reach of the International Criminal Court, by requiring UNSC approval of referred cases, 
and then to subvert the Court’s jurisdiction itself, hardened international opposition to US 
demands, and strengthened the determination of signatory states to make the court truly 
independent of the Security Council and to embolden opponents committed to more binding 
forms of multilateralism.
31 
                                                      
30 These include genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and potentially the crime of aggression, 
if the Assembly of States Parties is able to reach an agreement defining it. The founding Rome Statute is 
available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/99_corr/2.htm.  
31 For further background, see Congressional Research Service (2006), Lee (1999), Morris (2001), 
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The US has made various claims against the court.
32 The first is the ICC’s possible assertion of 
jurisdiction over US soldiers charged with ‘war crimes’ resulting from legitimate uses of force, 
and perhaps over civilian policy-makers, even if the United States does not ratify the Rome 
Statute. The United States sought to exempt US soldiers and employees from the jurisdiction of 
the ICC based on the unique position the United States occupies with regard to international 
peacekeeping (Grossman, 2002). Opponents depict the objection as US reluctance to be held 
accountable for gross human rights violations or to the standard established for the rest of the 
world. Second, the US has argued that the court lacks sufficient oversight mechanisms for 
confirmation of officials, and their impeachment where necessary. Third, the US insisted that a 
prosecution should require a positive referral from the Security Council. Opponents rejected this 
claim, and no such requirement now exists. A prosecution can be started on the prosecutor’s 
own initiative, overseen only by the court’s own judges. Fourth, some Americans have criticised 
the court for not protecting defendants’ human rights through provisions commonplace in the 
US legal system, and hence that ratification by the United States of the Rome Statute would 
require an amendment to the US Constitution.
33 Supporters of the Rome Statute contend it 
contains a comprehensive set of procedural safeguards that offers substantially similar 
protections as provided in the US Constitution. 
When the US proved unsuccessful in its efforts to reform the Rome Statute, it began to 
undertake measures to circumvent the court, to subvert it and to shield US nationals from it. In 
2002, the US Congress passed the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act (ASPA), which 
contained a number of provisions, including prohibitions on the United States providing military 
aid to countries that had ratified the Rome Statute.
34 More ominously for ICC supporters, 
Section 2008 of APSA authorised the President to use “all means necessary and appropriate” to 
bring about the release of covered United States and allied persons, upon the request of the 
detainee’s government, who are being detained or imprisoned by or on behalf of the ICC. APSA 
limited US cooperation with the Court to cases dealing with enemies of the United States. The 
United States also threatened to use its Security Council veto to block renewal of the mandates 
of several UN peacekeeping operations, unless the Security Council agreed to permanently 
exempt US nationals from the Court's jurisdiction.
35 In 2004, the Nethercutt Amendment to the 
                                                      
32 In 2002, then Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton 
summarized the US position regarding the ICC: “For a number of reasons, the United States decided that 
the ICC had unacceptable consequences for our national sovereignty. Specifically, the ICC is an 
organization whose precepts go against fundamental American notions of sovereignty, checks and 
balances, and national independence. It is an agreement that is harmful to the national interests of the 
United States, and harmful to our presence abroad”. See Bolton (2002).  
33 RenewAmerica articulates this: “Because the ICC is inconsistent with fundamental constitutional 
protections, the federal government is without authority to ratify the treaty absent a constitutional 
amendment.” If the US Government were to ratify an ICC treaty, there almost certainly would be an 
immediate legal challenge to the authority of the government to forfeit any constitutional right except by 
a constitutional amendment (see Voigt, 2006).  
34 There were a number of exceptions to this prohibition, including NATO members, major non-NATO 
allies and countries that have entered into an agreement with the United States not to hand over US 
nationals to the Court (see Article 98 agreements below). ASPA also excluded any military aid that the 
US President certified to be in the US national interest. 
35 After the Bush administration threatened to veto a United Nations Security Council resolution to extend 
the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia on the ground that it did not contain sufficient guarantees that US 
participants would be immune to prosecution by the ICC, the Security Council adopted a resolution that 
would defer for one year any prosecution of participants in missions established or authorised by the UN 
whose home countries have not ratified the Rome Statute. That resolution was renewed through 1 July 
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Foreign Appropriations Bill suspended Economic Support Fund assistance to ICC States Parties 
without bilateral immunity agreements (BIAs) with the United States. The funds affected 
support initiatives including peacekeeping, anti-terrorism measures, democracy-building and 
drug interdiction.  
As part of the US campaign to exclude its citizens and military personnel from extradition by 
the ICC, the US Bush administration also approached countries around the world to conclude 
Bilateral Immunity Agreements, or ‘Article 98’ agreements. The United States has used bilateral 
diplomacy to persuade many nations to sign these agreements. The US has a law requiring the 
suspension of military assistance and US Economic Support Fund (ESF) aid to those States 
Parties that do not sign these agreements. The granting of such special favours is of course 
always subject to diplomacy. ESF funding entails a wide range of governance programmes 
including international counter-terrorism efforts, peace process programmes, anti-drug 
trafficking initiatives, truth and reconciliation commissions, wheelchair distribution and 
HIV/AIDS education, among others.  
The height of US bellicosity came in 2003, when the United States stopped military aid for 35 
countries (among them nine European countries). However, in what some view as a sign that the 
administration is softening its stance with respect to the ICC, the United States did not exercise 
its veto power at the Security Council to prevent the referral of a case against Sudan’s leaders 
for the alleged genocide in Darfur. 
Goals, means and impact 
Initially supportive of a new norm to address “the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community”,
 yet with qualms about certain implication for US interests stemming 
from such a far-reaching initiative, Washington initially sought to reform the treaty. Having 
failed in this attempt, the US actively engaged in efforts to circumvent, subvert and shield 
Americans from the Court. Overall such efforts have failed. The Court is now a reality, and anti-
ICC laws and impunity agreements have only served to align the US with pariah states of the 
international criminal justice system. The major impact of the US anti-ICC campaign has been 
to diminish the credibility of US efforts to forge coalitions against human rights abusers and to 
undermine future US efforts to advance international justice in discrete cases. Furthermore, the 
US is unable to vote in these bodies, may not nominate US nationals to serve as judges, may not 
cast a vote in elections for or against judges or the Prosecutor (or for their removal), and may 
not vote on the ICC’s budget. It will not be able to vote on the definition of the crime of 
aggression or its inclusion within the jurisdiction of the ICC, or on any other amendment to the 
Rome Statute, unless it ratifies it. By appearing to demand special treatment in the form of 
immunity from the ICC, the United States has bolstered the perception of its unilateral approach 
to world affairs and its unwillingness to abide by the same laws that apply to other nations. This 
perception could undermine US efforts at coalition-building to gain international support for the 
present war against terrorism and operations in Iraq, as well as future international endeavours. 
In March of 2006, even Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice admitted that the US position was 
“sort of the same as shooting ourselves in the foot” (Congressional Research Service, 2006). 
Conditioning factor: Domestic context 
Initial Wilsonian enthusiasm for a far-reaching new norm in international law gave way to more 
sober conclusions about the implications of the ICC for the US position in the world, and 
galvanised significant opposition from Jacksonians and Jeffersonians enraged that an 
international court lacking, in their view, any democratic legitimacy and lacking basic 
constitutional provisions, could potentially hold sway over US citizens abroad or even at home. 
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Council protections typical of other kinds of multilateral arrangements only stiffened domestic 
opposition. 
Conditioning factor: Domestic capabilities 
Through its efforts to reform the Rome Statute, as well as its efforts to get around its provisions, 
the US demonstrated that it had a significant number of options at its disposal. In the end, 
however, US efforts proved counterproductive. 
Conditioning factor: External environment 
The external environment proved hostile to US efforts to arrange special carve-outs or 
privileges under the treaty, and subsequent US unilateral activities only harden opposition to 
any particular recognition of the US role in the world.  
All of those declared by the president to be enemy combatants, including US citizens 
Yaser Esam Hamdi and Jose Padilla, are, according to the Bush administration, 
excluded from the protections granted to prisoners of war by the Geneva Conventions as 
well as the due process rights afforded defendants in the American court system by the 
US Constitution and acts of Congress. 
Summary 
How much weight can we assign to US Realpolitik efforts that go wrong? The Bush 
Administration’s assertion that it can exclude anyone declared to be an ‘enemy combatant’ from 
the protections granted prisoners by the Geneva Conventions, despite Supreme Court judgment 
otherwise, and with results that have questioned prevailing standards of international law, have 
damaged international regard for the US. In these cases the conditioning factors appear to be 
fairly significant; if an Administration decides to advance a Realpolitik policy, it often finds 
acquiescence within the Congress and in the broader public, or at least enjoys a period of time to 
initiate such a policy before the inevitable domestic checks and balances come into play. It also 
has considerable capabilities to advance such a policy. Rarely does the external environment, 
geared more to power than to principle, stand in the way. Given this rather permissive setting, 
then, it is perhaps striking that such policies are relatively limited in the broad panoply of US 
foreign policies. The Iran-Contra affair is another prominent example (National Security 
Archive, 2006). This case highlights that the US can also act as a ‘norm blocker’, even as it acts 
as a ‘norm entrepreneur’ in other areas. 
3.5 Imperial  intended:  The  US Invasion of Panama, 1989 
The US has also acted in ways that may be characterised as imperial intended, i.e. exercising 
control over weaker countries in ways it has claimed are normative, yet are widely judged to be 
in breach of international law.  
Narrative 
The United States invasion of Panama, codenamed Operation Just Cause, deposed Panamanian 
military leader and political dictator Manuel Noriega in December 1989, during the 
administration of US President George H. W. Bush. This action was preceded by over a year of 
diplomatic tension between the United States and Panama, the highlights of which were specific 
allegations by the US that Noriega was complicit with money launderers and drug traffickers 
and a nullified national election in 1989. Several months of US troop build-up followed these 
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President Bush (1989) gave four basic reasons for the invasion. The first was to safeguard the 
lives of the 35,000 US citizens in Panama. There had been numerous clashes between US and 
Panamanian forces; one American soldier had been killed a few days earlier and several 
incidents of harassment of Americans had taken place. Bush stated that Noriega had declared 
that a state of war existed between the US and Panama and that he also threatened American 
lives. The second reason was to combating drug trafficking. Panama had become a centre for 
drug money laundering and a transit point for drug trafficking to the US and Europe. The US 
had evidence that Noriega was directly involved in these operations, and in February 1988 had 
been indicted for drug trafficking. The third reason given was to protect the integrity of the 
Torrijos-Carter Treaties governing the Panama Canal. Members of Congress and others in the 
US political establishment claimed that Noriega threatened the neutrality of the Panama Canal 
and that the United States had the right under the treaties to intervene militarily to protect the 
canal. The fourth was that elections scheduled earlier in the year, which would have brought 
Guillermo Endara to power, had been illegally nullified by Noriega, thus subverting 
Panamanian democracy.
36 
A few hours after the invasion began, Guillermo Endara was sworn in at Rodman Naval Base. 
Military operations lasted only a few days. Noriega obtained refuge in the Vatican diplomatic 
mission in Panama City and finally surrendered to the US military on 3 January 1990. He was 
immediately put on a military transport plane and extradited to the United States. 
Goals, means and impact 
The US sought to maintain control over Panama in the years leading to the final transfer of the 
Panama Canal to Panamanian authority. When Noriega, who had once been a valuable US 
intelligence asset, began to act in ways considered ‘destabilising’, the US conveyed a clear 
warning to Noriega, as recounted by former US Ambassador Briggs: “Our underlying message 
was this: You know the current state of our relations with the Sandinistas in Nicaragua (where 
the Pentagon was providing support to the Contras in their war against the ruling government). 
If you continue to act as a destabilizing force, you can expect the United States to turn on you as 
we have turned on them” (Briggs, 2007). Noriega ignored this warning and turned against the 
US. When he blocked the election of US-supported candidate Endara, the Bush Administration 
concluded that Noriega had to go. Estimates of casualties from the invasion range from 300-
3,000. Following the invasion and Endara’s assumption of power, relations between the 
Panamanian and US governments again became close. 
Conditioning factor: Domestic context 
Despite having ratified the Torrijos-Carter Treaties that would relinquish US control of the 
Panama Canal by the turn of the century, members of Congress were concerned that Noriega 
would politicise operation of the Canal, with negative consequences for the United States. 
President Bush’s popularity ratings soared after the invasion. In the end, the US did fulfil its 
obligations under the Torrijos-Carter Treaties and turned over the canal and military bases to 
Panama in 1999. 
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Conditioning factor: Domestic capabilities 
The US had a range of instruments to deal with Noriega. He was indicted for drug smuggling, 
funds were channelled to support the opposition, an economic blockade was imposed and 
ultimately military force was used to depose him.  
Conditioning factor: External environment 
On 22 December 1989, the Organization of American States (OAS) passed a resolution 
deploring the invasion and calling for withdrawal of US troops. The OAS Charter, to which the 
US is a signatory and party, prohibits members from invading other members for any reason. 
Key European states supported the US, however: a draft UN Security Council resolution 
demanding the immediate withdrawal of United States forces from Panama was vetoed on 23 
December by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States which cited its right of self-
defence of 35,000 Americans present on the Panama Canal. On 29 December, the General 
Assembly of the United Nations voted 75–20 with 40 abstentions to condemn the invasion as a 
“flagrant violation of international law”. 
Summary 
The US has a long history of using ‘gunboat diplomacy’ to maintain its sphere of influence and 
‘stabilise’ regimes in Central America and the Caribbean. The Reagan Administration’s 
invasion of the tiny island of Grenada is another example from this period. The Clinton 
Administration intervened in Haiti without UN authorisation.
37 Defining the Western 
Hemisphere to extend into the Pacific Ocean, Americans targeted such Pacific Islands as Hawaii 
and Guam as appropriate venues for American expansion and development. Between 1893 and 
1898, an American-led coup toppled the independent Hawaiian constitutional monarchy and led 
to annexation of Hawaii by the United States, and the American defeat of Spain in Cuba, Puerto 
Rico and the Philippines won for the United States an empire of its own – though the United 
States permitted Cuba to go its way as an independent country. Further American exertions of 
power and influence won the independence of Panama from Colombia, followed by a coerced 
treaty between the US and Panama that gave the United States territory on the Panamanian 
isthmus and, ultimately, the Panama Canal.  
Other examples of ‘imperial intended’, if we use Tocci’s framework, would be intervention by 
the US and its European partners in Bosnia and again in Kosovo. The Bosnian intervention was 
carried out with support of the UN. The Kosovo intervention did not gain support in the UN 
Security Council, but the US and its European partners acted anyway in the face of massive 
human tragedy. In this sense, the Kosovo intervention was not ‘intended’ to violate UN 
principles, but the paralysis of the Security Council prompted the US and Europe to act anyway. 
The Kosovo intervention, according to one observer, “was illegal in the sense of not having 
followed the letter of the UN Charter but legitimate in the sense of being consistent with the 
norms and principles that the charter embodies” (Jentleson, 2007, p. 281; Independent 
International Commission on Kosovo, 2000). 
All of these examples raise a core question: Should the US be considered an imperial, rather 
than a normative power? Today, ‘American empire’ is a term of approval and optimism for 
some and disparagement and danger for others. Neoconservatives celebrate the imperial 
exercise of US power, which they believe to be a liberal force that promotes democracy and 
undercuts tyranny, terrorism, military aggression and weapons proliferation. Max Boot (2003) 
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insists that the “greatest danger” facing the US, in fact, “is that we won’t use all of our power 
for fear of the ‘I’ word – imperialism... Given the historical baggage that ‘imperialism’ carries, 
there’s no need for the US government to embrace the term. But it should definitely embrace the 
practice.” Neo-imperialists are refuted by domestic critics, however, who worry about 
unacceptable financial costs of empire, its corrosive effect on democracy and the threat it poses 
to the institutions and alliances that have secured US national interests since World War II 
(Ignatieff, 2003b).  
Michael Ignatieff (2003a) also uses the term ‘empire’, but acknowledges that: 
America’s empire is not like empires of times past, built on colonies, conquest and the 
white man’s burden….The 21st century imperium is a new invention in the annals of 
political science, an empire lite, a global hegemony whose grace notes are free markets, 
human rights and democracy, enforced by the most awesome military power the world has 
ever known. It is the imperialism of a people who remember that their country secured its 
independence by revolt against an empire, and who like to think of themselves as the friend 
of freedom everywhere. It is an empire without consciousness of itself as such, constantly 
shocked that its good intentions arouse resentment abroad. 
Ignatieff argues that this does not make it any less of an empire. I beg to differ. Words matter, 
and the difference between hegemony and empire is significant for our purposes. Rather than 
simply blur the definition, it is better to understand the distinction. 
The classic understanding of imperialism is a form of direct or monopoly control of another 
nation or region. Empires are “relationships of political control imposed by some political 
societies over the effective sovereignty of other political societies” (Maier, 2007; see also Lind, 
2007a; Mandelbaum, 2005). Over the centuries empires have shared characteristics of 
subordination; coercion; some form of ethnic, national, religious, or racial difference between 
the imperial power and the society it controls; and assertive efforts by the empire, when 
challenged, to perpetuate its imperial rule, if need be by force, as in the case of France in both 
Indochina and Algeria after World War II. Empire is dictatorship by foreigners. Hegemony is 
different. In old Greece, a hegemon referred to an army commander who led armed forces 
consisting of free citizens of the polis and city-states. During that period, it was assumed that he 
acted in the interest of mutual security. Hegemony is traditionally defined as an international 
interaction and a leadership relationship “whose existence and maintenance are dependent, on 
the one hand, on the power resources, the will and the strategic competence of a leading state 
(the hegemon), and on the other hand, on the voluntary acquiescence, at least in principle, of a 
homogenous – in terms of organization of power – group of states.” (Maier, 2007) 
Which pattern more accurately describes the United States? Ultimately, the notion of empire is 
misleading and misses the distinctive aspects of the global political order that has developed 
around the various dimensions of US power – military, economic, political and normative. After 
reviewing and comparing empires throughout history, Maier (2007) underscores “the difficulty 
of shoehorning the United States into the received models of imperial power”, and suggests 
instead that “hegemonic power” is a more apt description. 
As discussed, the US has a long tradition of pursuing crude imperial policies, most notably in 
Latin America and the Middle East. But as John Ikenberry (2004) notes, for most countries, the 
US-led order has been a negotiated system wherein the United States has sought participation by 
other states on terms that are mutually agreeable. This is true in three respects. First, the United 
States has provided public goods – particularly the extension of security and the support for an 
open trade regime – in exchange for the cooperation of other states. Second, power in the US 
system is exercised through rules and institutions; power politics still exist, but arbitrary and 
indiscriminate power has largely been reigned in. There are obvious exceptions, but these are 
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opportunities’ – informal access to the policy-making processes of the United States and the 
intergovernmental institutions that make up the international system. The American order is 
hierarchical and ultimately sustained by economic and military power, but it is put at the service 
of an expanding system of democracy, free markets and the rule of law, and open to others 
willing and able to join. This is not empire; it is a US-led democratic political order that has no 
name or historical precedent.  
American influence in the world is certainly considerable, but the instances where the US has 
exercised direct control in the manner defined above are limited and rather specific, and even in 
these cases with other attributes, such as an effort, as in the Balkans, to share this control with 
others, or to divest itself of its responsibility as quickly as feasible, as in Haiti in the 1990s. 
There is no denying that such cases exist, but they are exceptions that prove the rule that the US 
acts more as a hegemonic than imperial power (Mandelbaum, 2005).
38 
The debate about empire also misses the most important international development of recent 
years: the long peace among great powers. Capitalism, democracy, nuclear weapons and a 
shared concern about terrorism all help explain this peace. But so too does the unique way in 
which the United States has gone about the business of building an international order. US 
success stems from the creation and extension of international institutions that have limited and 
legitimated US power. Ultimately, the current debate centres on this question: Does the US 
remain committed to this extensive and deep-rooted system, or does its assertion of power since 
the end of the cold war and particularly since September 11 represent a fundamental break with 
the past? A more conclusive answer might come after examining the next category: imperial 
unintended. 
3.6  Imperial Unintended: The US Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, 2003-
07 
The US has also acted in ways that may be characterised as imperial unintended, i.e. pursuing 
normative goals in disrespect of international law and outside the boundaries of international 
institutions, yet failing to achieve its intended results. I have chosen the US invasion and 
occupation of Iraq for two reasons. First, even though the operation continues today and its 
ultimate outcome remains uncertain, the Bush administration clearly did not achieve its intended 
results in the four years following the invasion. Second, the Bush Administration’s invasion of 
Iraq is potentially pivotal to the debate about the US as an imperial or normative power.  
Narrative 
The 2003 invasion of Iraq took place 18 March-1 May 2003, and was led by the United States, 
backed by British forces and smaller contingents from Australia and Poland. Other countries 
were involved in its aftermath.  
The objectives of the invasion, according to US President George W. Bush and former UK 
Prime Minister Tony Blair, were to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam 
Hussein’s support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people. Bush said the actual trigger was 
Iraq's failure to take a “final opportunity” to disarm itself of nuclear, chemical, and biological 
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weapons that US and coalition officials deemed to be an immediate and intolerable threat to 
world peace.
39 
No such weapons were found. In January 2005, the Iraq Survey Group concluded that Iraq had 
ended its WMD programs in 1991 and had no WMD at the time of the invasion (although some 
misplaced or abandoned remnants of pre-1991 production were found).  
After the invasion of the Gulf War of 1991, the US and the international community maintained 
a policy of containment towards Iraq. This policy involved economic sanctions, US and UK 
patrols of Iraqi no-fly zones declared to protect Kurds in northern Iraq and Shiites in the south, 
and ongoing inspections to prevent Iraqi WMD development. In October 1998, US policy began 
to shift away from containment and towards ‘regime change’, as the US Congress passed and 
President Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act in response to Iraq’s termination of its 
cooperation with UN weapons inspectors. The Act provided $97 million for Iraqi “democratic 
opposition organizations” to “establish a programme to support a transition to democracy in 
Iraq”. This legislation contrasted with the terms set out in UNSC Resolution 687, which focused 
on weapons and weapons programmes and made no mention of regime change. One month after 
the passage of the Iraq Liberation Act, the US and UK launched a bombardment campaign of 
Iraq called Operation Desert Fox. The campaign’s express rationale was to hamper the Hussein 
government’s ability to produce chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, but US officials also 
hoped it would help weaken Hussein’s grip on power. 
With the inauguration of George W. Bush in 2001, the US moved towards a more active policy 
of ‘regime change’ in Iraq. Nine days after September 11, President Bush addressed a joint 
session of Congress and announced a new ‘war on terrorism’, which conflated the challenge 
posed by al-Qaeda and that offered by Saddam Hussein, and which was also accompanied by a 
doctrine of ‘pre-emptive’ military action. Some Bush advisors favoured an immediate invasion 
of Iraq, while others advocated building an international coalition and obtaining UN 
authorisation. Bush eventually decided to seek UN authorisation, but held out the possibility of 
invading unilaterally. 
Throughout 2002, the Bush administration made clear that removing Saddam Hussein from 
power in order to restore international peace and security was a major goal. Bush made his case 
to the international community for an invasion of Iraq in a 12 September 2002 address to the 
UN Security Council.
  Key US allies, including France and Germany, were critical of plans to 
invade Iraq, arguing instead for continued diplomacy and weapons inspections. After 
considerable debate, the Security Council adopted a compromise resolution, 1441, which 
authorised the resumption of weapons inspections and promised “serious consequences” for 
non-compliance. 
In February 2003, US Secretary of State Colin Powell presented evidence at the UN alleging 
that Iraq was actively producing chemical and biological weapons and had ties to al-Qaeda, 
claims that have since been widely discredited. As a follow-up to Powell’s presentation, the US, 
UK and Spain proposed a UN Resolution authorising the use of force in Iraq, but US NATO 
allies Canada, France and Germany, together with Russia, strongly urged continued diplomacy. 
Facing a losing vote as well as a likely veto from France and Russia, the US eventually 
withdrew its resolution. 
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The US and UK then abandoned Security Council procedures and decided to pursue the 
invasion without UN authorisation, a decision of questionable legality. On 17 March 2003, 
Bush gave Hussein and his two sons 48 hours to leave Iraq. Iraq rejected this demand, 
maintaining that it had already disarmed as required. The invasion of Iraq began on 20 March, 
without UN support.  
While never making an explicit connection between Iraq and the September 11th attacks, the 
Bush administration repeatedly insinuated a connection, thereby creating a false impression 
among the American public. Similarly, assertions of significant operational links between Iraq 
and al Qaeda were subsequently largely discredited by the intelligence community and 
eventually retracted by Secretary Powell himself. 
The Bush Administration worked very hard for a UN resolution to authorise an attack on Iraq. It 
extorted cooperation primarily by threats to act unilaterally rather than through persuasion or 
concessions. It condemned the UN for lacking the courage of its convictions with regard to 12 
years of Security Council resolutions demanding full Iraqi compliance. Between Iraq's invasion 
of Kuwait in 1990 and the US/UK invasion of Iraq in 2003, the UN Security Council passed 
nearly 60 resolutions on Iraq and Kuwait. The most relevant to this issue was Resolution 678, 
passed on 29 November 1990, which authorised “member states co-operating with the 
Government of Kuwait...to use all necessary means” to 1) implement Security Council 
Resolution 660 and other resolutions calling for the end of Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait and 
withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwaiti territory and 2) “restore international peace and 
security in the area”. Resolution 678 was not rescinded or nullified by succeeding resolutions. 
Resolution 1441 was most prominent during the run-up to the war and formed the main 
backdrop for Secretary of State Powell’s address to the Security Council one month before the 
invasion.
40 At the same time, Bush administration officials advanced a parallel legal argument 
using the earlier resolutions. Under this reasoning, by failing to disarm and submit to weapons 
inspections, Iraq was in violation of UNSC Resolutions 660 and 678, and the US could legally 
compel Iraq's compliance through military means. Critics and proponents of the legal rationale 
based on UN resolutions argue that the legal right to determine how to enforce its resolutions 
lies with the Security Council alone, not with individual nations. 
Goals, means and impact 
The administration’s goals were to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to remove 
Saddam Hussein from power, and to “free” the Iraqi people. In addition, there were many 
statements indicating support for the creation of a stable, democratic Iraq closely tied to the 
United States. The US military demonstrated overwhelming military prowess and ended the 
military campaign in a very short time. Astonishingly, however, the administration did little to 
plan for securing the peace after it had won the war. Efforts to ensure stability, therefore, 
suffered considerably in the wake of insurgent conflict, and throughout the four-year period Iraq 
never established a secure environment in which to rebuild its economy and reorient its politics. 
While estimates on the number of casualties vary widely, the majority of deaths and injuries – 
numbering in the hundreds of thousands – occurred after US President Bush declared the end of 
major combat operations on 1 May 2003. The administration was unable to use the tremendous 
military and economic power of the United States to create the stable Iraq it had sought, and 
failed to broaden its small coalition to include other major allies or countries. Moreover, the 
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Bush administration’s ability to use economic or other incentives as political leverage to enlist 
the support of other countries for the US effort was strikingly limited. It failed, for instance, to 
secure the support of countries such as Angola, Chile, Guinea, Mexico and Pakistan in the 
Security Council before the war began. The bold unilateral exercise of military power, coupled 
with efforts to disentangle the US from the constraints of multilateralism, undermined US 
legitimacy throughout the world and severely compromised the authority that flowed from such 
legitimacy.  
The Iraq war proved to be damaging to all major players. The US suffered considerably in terms 
of global perceptions of its legitimacy and effectiveness. The EU experienced a bitter split 
among its members. The UN was condemned by those who went to war for lacking the courage 
of its convictions with regard to 12 years of Security Council resolutions demanding full Iraqi 
compliance, and condemned equally by those who opposed the war for lacking the courage of 
its convictions and not censuring the invasion (Thakur & Sidhu, 2006, pp. 12-14).  
Conditioning factor: Domestic context 
The Bush administration won domestic authorisation for an invasion in October 2002 when the 
US Congress passed a Joint Resolution authorising military force against Iraq. A few days 
before the Senate vote, about 75 senators were told in closed session that Saddam Hussein had 
the means of delivering biological and chemical weapons by unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) 
drones that could be launched from ships off the Atlantic coast to attack US eastern seaboard 
cities. In fact, Iraq had no such capability (Nelson, 2004; Lowe, 2003; and Mackay, 2003). 
While the resolution authorised the President to “use any means necessary” against Iraq, 
Americans polled in January 2003 widely favoured further diplomacy over an invasion.
41  
The Bush administration’s continued insinuations of a tie between Saddam Hussein and 
international terrorism, however, did have a significant impact on US public opinion: by 
September 2003, 70% of Americans believed there was a link between Saddam Hussein and the 
9/1l attacks.
42 
Critics of the war argued that Iraq was not the top strategic priority in the war on terror or in the 
Middle East and suggested that it could potentially destabilise the surrounding region. They 
were marginalised, yet included not only Democrats but leading figures within the Republican 
party. Prominent among such critics was Brent Scowcroft, who served as National Security 
Adviser to George H.W. Bush. In a 15 August 2002 Wall Street Journal editorial entitled 
“Don’t Attack Saddam”, Scowcroft warned: “Possibly the most dire consequences would be the 
effect in the region” where there could be “an explosion of outrage against us” that “could well 
destabilize Arab regimes” and “could even swell the ranks of the terrorists”. All his predictions 
came to pass.  
Conditioning factor: Domestic capabilities 
The US had considerable military capability to win the war, but as indicated demonstrated a 
striking lack of ability to secure the peace. Little effort was undertaken to plan for the peace or 
to anticipate insurgent activity and an unsettled security environment for the years following the 
invasion. The State Department’s Future of Iraq plan was dismissed by both the Pentagon and 
the White House, which appears to have imagined that once the conventional battle against 
Saddam was won, its job was done, and a new state would build itself. Stabilisation and 
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reconstruction capabilities were relatively weak, particularly when compared to the task at hand. 
Efforts to ensure stability, therefore, suffered considerably in the wake of insurgent conflict, and 
throughout the four-year period Iraq never established a secure environment in which to rebuild 
its economy and reorient its politics. 
Conditioning factor: External environment 
The US and its small coalition of allies faced considerable opposition from most other nations in 
the world. Opposition rallies were held in cities all over the world. International organisations 
largely decided against engagement in Iraq due to security concerns, and a number of key US 
allies refused to participate.  
Summary 
US policies toward Israel-Palestine may also be considered as imperial unintended, in ways 
similar to those Tocci has charted in her case study on the EU. The Bush administration’s 
declaration of a war on terrorism, in which countries are either “with us or against us”, has also 
failed to garner enthusiastic support for a US-led global effort. The unsuccessful US 
intervention in Lebanon in the early 1980s and US efforts to destabilise the Sandinista regime in 
Nicaragua, for which the United States was convicted at the International Court of Justice (cf. 
Nicaragua vs. United States), are other examples of ‘imperial unintended’ policies.  
As mentioned, it is still premature to conclude that the Bush Administration’s invasion of Iraq 
signals a sustained US turn away from the liberal hegemonic system that the US shaped, led and 
profited from over the previous six decades. The record of those six decades, on the whole, was 
successful, however, while the record of efforts to turn away from that order, to subvert it, or to 
turn US pre-eminence into true imperialism, has largely been one of failure. In fact, Iraq has the 
potential of becoming the most significant foreign policy blunder in the history of the American 
republic. One consequence may well be a national abandonment of the attitudes that were 
responsible for it.  
There are important signs, as reflected both in public opinion and in the statements of the three 
leading Presidential candidates, that there is majority support for a course affirming that US 
interests and ideals are advanced best in the world through consensus-building leadership to 
advance the peaceful growth of a relatively stable zone of democracies and market economies. 
Republican as well as Democratic candidates for the presidency are, with varying degrees of 
explicitness, promising a restoration of what amounts to traditional American internationalism – 
that is, a repudiation of the historically curious alliance between Jacksonians and neo-con 
Wilsonians that marked the Bush administration in favour of a new domestic coalition. 
3.7  Status quo – Intended: US Policy toward Taiwan, 1978-2007 
The US has also acted in ways that may be characterised as status quo – intended. US policy 
regarding the status of Taiwan is a good example.  
Narrative 
Over roughly three decades since US-China normalisation, the US has favoured the preservation 
of the fundamental status quo regarding Taiwan, i.e. indefinite acceptance by all parties of 
Taiwan's ambiguous political status. The island should continue to enjoy de facto independence, 
but not internationally recognised legal independence, until Taipei and Beijing can agree on a 
peaceful resolution of their dispute. 
The United States does not support Taiwan’s independence and opposes unilateral changes to 
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substantive cross-Strait dialogue, and supports expansion of transportation and communication 
links across the Strait aimed at increasing political, economic, social and cultural exchanges and 
reducing the chances of any miscommunication or misunderstanding. That rationale enables 
Washington to acknowledge Beijing's position that there is only one China and that Taiwan is 
part of China while continuing to sell arms to Taiwan and maintain an implicit commitment to 
defend the island against a Chinese military assault.  
Under this approach, the US pursues two tracks. First, it does not want to give Taipei any reason 
to declare formal independence, as Jacques deLisle (2001) states: “either by creating excessive 
confidence that the United States will stand fully behind Taiwan in a cross-strait crisis produced 
by ‘unprovoked’ moves toward full separate statehood or by creating excessive worry about the 
United States' commitment to Taiwan such that moves toward a claim of de jure independence 
look like a reasonable gamble in perilous circumstances.” Second, Washington does not want to 
give Beijing any reason to believe it could coerce Taipei, again, in deLisle’s words, “either by 
allowing doubt about the US commitment to preserving Taiwan’s autonomy or by threatening to 
cross Beijing’s threshold of intolerable ‘interference’ to ‘separate’ Taiwan from China”. 
The United States has anchored its status quo approach in a series of documents and 
proclamations, particularly its ‘one China’ policy, the Taiwan Relations Act, three US-China 
Joint Communiqués, President Clinton’s ‘three nos’ (no support for Taiwan independence; for 
two Chinas or one-China, one-Taiwan; or for Taiwan’s membership in states-only 
organisations) and carefully crafted policy statements embodying a policy of ‘strategic 
ambiguity’.
43 
Goals, means and impact 
The US seeks to preserve the status quo arrangements regarding a potentially explosive 
relationship, which if it unravelled could drag the US into conflict and damage vital US interests 
in East Asia. It does this in a variety of ways, resulting in a relatively tolerable situation between 
Taipei and Beijing. In addition, within the international space created by this approach, Taiwan 
has transformed from dictatorship to democracy, and its economy has developed close 
interactions with the Chinese mainland, providing another incentive for both Taipei and Beijing 
not to rock the boat as each seeks to benefit further from the global economy. Moreover, 
continuation of the status quo preserves confidence in American commitments throughout the 
region and gives American allies in East Asia less cause for serious reassessment of regional 
power arrangements.  
Conditioning factor: Domestic context 
Although Congressional ire due to its exclusion from the US effort to recognise Beijing and de-
recognise Taipei led to Congressional activism, particularly the Taiwan Relations Act, for 
decades the Congress has left Taiwan policy largely to the Executive branch. Today, 
congressional concerns tend to focus more on economic relations with Taiwan, arms sales and 
human rights issues. In general terms, however, US domestic politics has provided support for 
the triangular status quo approach of successive administrations. 
Conditioning factor: Domestic capabilities 
The US commands a panoply of economic, military, diplomatic and political tools with both 
Taipei and Beijing, and seeks to use them in an integrated fashion to preserve its status quo 
approach. Whenever Taiwan pushes too hard on independence, or when Beijing undertakes any 
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untoward motion suggesting reunification, Washington does not hesitate to admonish either 
side. The result of this balancing act has been relative stability.  
Conditioning factor: External environment 
While Taipei and Beijing have each accepted the status quo for an uncertain period, neither has 
given up its respective view that ultimately the status quo is unacceptable. The People’s 
Republic of China interprets the status quo as synonymous with a one-China policy and 
Taiwan’s eventual reunification with the mainland. Taiwan’s concept of the status quo is exactly 
the opposite: the status quo means Taiwan’s independence. The status quo solution has allowed 
each to bide its time while blunting any sudden or provocative developments. 
Summary 
Other examples of status quo-intended policies include US policy towards Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt and US approaches to climate change.  
3.8  Status quo – Unintended: the US and South Africa, 1948-90 
Narrative 
The US has also acted in ways that may be characterised as status quo – unintended, i.e. 
pursued its foreign policies in full respect of international law and institutions with the primary 
purpose of simply satisfying its possession goals and with little interest in shaping the normative 
milieu, yet unintentionally engendering normative results. US policy toward South Africa is an 
interesting example because decades of rigid US policy ultimately generated a domestic 
backlash that, combined with changes in South Africa itself, upended the status quo policies of 
the Executive branch and put the US firmly on the side of normative change.  
Goals, means and impact 
Only in the late 1980s did the US engage meaningfully to oppose apartheid in South Africa, and 
only due to efforts by the US Congress and civil society groups, rather than the Executive 
branch.  
Between the 1950s and the 1970s, domestic political support within South Africa for the black 
liberation movement stemmed largely from the South African Communist Party. Moreover, 
insurgents in the broader region were receiving support from the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, 
Libya and the PLO. During the cold war, the US assigned higher priority to containing 
communism and protecting US economic interests than with ending apartheid, despite support 
in US civil society for South Africa’s civil rights movement. The US had multiple stakes in 
preserving access to a stable South Africa, ranging from the need to contain communism; the 
significant US corporate investments in South African trade, industry, banks and natural 
resources; and the importance of protecting the strategic position of the Cape of Good Hope – a 
heavily traversed sea lane for the transport of oil and a prime access point to West Africa, the 
Indian subcontinent and the Persian Gulf. These goals led the US government to support 
perpetuation of the apartheid status quo, despite a rhetorical stance opposing apartheid. This 
position became clear during the 1952 debate on apartheid, when the US noted that apartheid 
was not in keeping with the UN Charter but emphasised that countries should not intervene in 
the sovereign affairs of other nations.
44 Although it joined 60 other countries supporting the UN 
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resolution that rejected apartheid, it did nothing to curb its own investment in the apartheid 
state, and failed to apply its ‘non-interventionist’ standard to its own efforts to contain 
communism in other nations around the world. 
This dual approach characterised US policy throughout the cold war. Despite the anti-apartheid 
rhetoric of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, Washington refused to sign a General 
Assembly resolution calling for nations to sever economic ties, despite support by a large 
majority of other nations, and continued to rely on the apartheid government for support of its 
Cold War objectives. The US did support a ban on arms sales to South Africa, however, 
underscoring the seeming contradictions in US attitudes and policies. The Nixon and Ford 
administrations relaxed the arms embargo, abstained from key UN votes on anti-apartheid 
measures, extended trade between the US and South Africa, and supported South African 
intervention in Angola, all the while criticising apartheid in public. While the Carter 
administration took a stronger stand against apartheid, it was unable to effect significant change, 
and the Reagan administration continued the US status quo approach (Nesbitt, 2004, p. 113).
45 
Reagan consistently rejected the use of sanctions, downplayed racial injustice under apartheid 
and even lent South Africa $1.1 billion in return for South Africa's cooperation in negotiating a 
peaceful settlement in Namibia and encouraging the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola 
(Baker, 2000, pp. 96-99; Nesbitt, 2004, p. 11). The administration argued that such ‘constructive 
engagement’ would enhance US influence in inducing apartheid leaders to share power with the 
black majority. 
Events, however, were making a mockery of such claims. Growing domestic unrest against 
apartheid in South Africa was sparked in 1983 by the establishment of a tricameral legislature 
that totally excluded the country’s black majority. South African President P.W. Botha brutally 
repressed demonstrations and spoke out against US anti-apartheid efforts. These developments, 
in turn, invigorated domestic US efforts to impose sanctions on the South African regime 
(Baker, 2000, p. 103). The Reagan administration’s rather tepid response – a limited ban on 
computer technology sales (Nesbitt, 2004, p. 134) – only fanned the flames of domestic 
opposition to US policy. Activists joined forces with some members of Congress and even with 
a considerable number of US corporations to demand sanctions against South Africa (Baker, 
2000, p. 104). In 1986, constructive engagement was upended when Congress approved the 
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) imposing a range of new sanctions, including bans 
on new investments, bank loans and some South African imports. Reagan vetoed the measure, 
but his congressional opponents mustered more than a two-thirds majority to override the 
President’s veto (Landsberg & de Coning, 1995, p. 8). The CAAA linked the relaxation of 
sanctions to the release of political prisoners, the repeal of the state of emergency and key 
apartheid laws. It also provided substantial funding for South African civil society groups 
opposed to apartheid. The CAAA was a watershed in US policy, overturning decades of US 
status quo policies toward South Africa and aligning the United States with anti-apartheid 
activists around the world. Sanctions began to bite hard, and South Africa became a pariah state. 
The US began to engage actively to encourage a peaceful transition. South African President De 
Klerk abandoned apartheid in 1990 (Baker, 2000, pp. 104-110).  
Conditioning factor: Domestic context 
Richard Goldstone (2005) has documented the history of what he calls the ‘two American 
policies’ toward apartheid – that of the Administration and that of the Congress and American 
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civil society. Early American support for the anti-apartheid movement came mainly from 
universities, churches, trade unions and civil rights organisations active in America’s own 
domestic fight over racial equality. For many American civil rights organisations, US policy 
towards South Africa became a litmus test for the racial attitudes of government at home. US 
companies also felt the pressure; many worked together with civil rights activists to enact what 
became known as the ‘Sullivan principles’ guiding US corporate practices in South Africa that 
promoted equality and training for black workers, supported their right to join trade unions, and 
withdrew the sale of products that could support apartheid (Goldstone, 2005; Goldstone & Ray, 
2004). 
The work of civil society helped convince members of Congress, led primarily by the Black 
Political Caucus, to change US policies that made the country complicit with apartheid. 
Goldstone (Nesbitt, 2004, pp. 133-134) concludes: “Reagan’s policy of constructive 
engagement crumbled in large part because of the efforts of organisations like TransAfrica and 
the Free South Africa Movement, which staged marches, sit-ins, and encouraged companies to 
end relations with South Africa and US citizens to disinvest from companies that did not apply 
the Sullivan principles.” 
The US legal community also made key contributions to the anti-apartheid movement. In 1979, 
American lawyers, together with the Ford and Carnegie Foundations, organised the first human 
rights convention in the history of South Africa. Two organisations were founded there – 
Lawyers for Human Rights and the Legal Resources Center – that started attacking apartheid 
laws and actually found limited success before a few judges, who wrote opinions supported by 
human rights principles and struck down some egregious provisions of apartheid laws. 
Goldstone (2005): “[T]his US intervention made a lasting impression on black South Africans 
and especially black South African lawyers, creating a general awareness that the United States 
was involved through its legal profession in attempting to alleviate the plight of victims of 
apartheid.” The American Bar Association initiated advocacy skills training for black South 
African lawyers, and American NGOs enabled South Africans and exiled ANC leaders to meet 
in international conferences sponsored by American groups – an otherwise illegal endeavour in 
South Africa (Mikell & Lyman, 2001, p. 87).  
Conditioning factor: Domestic capabilities 
The US had considerable capability to influence South African policies. US use of its veto 
power was important to blocking any effort by the UN to put teeth into its condemnation of 
apartheid, and US political and economic support helped bolster the regime. Similarly, the 
withdrawal of US support helped to isolate the regime and hasten the post-apartheid transition. 
Direct engagement between American and South African civil society groups also played an 
important role in training and empowering the South African opposition. 
Conditioning factor: External environment 
A closer look at the external environment reveals that non-state actors, particularly principled 
advocacy groups, can influence official perceptions and ranking of national security priorities 
and their views of acceptable international norms, i.e. what constitutes ‘appropriate behaviour’. 
Summary 
The timeframe for this case study is an important consideration. If one considered only the 
period between 1948 and, say, 1975, this case study might fit more appropriately under status 
quo intended. But treating the entire period showcases how official government policy can be 
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The US approach to the landmines treaty offers a related example. Activist leaders in the US 
Senate pushed the US to be the first nation to call for a global ban on landmines, but then the 
US turned against the international treaty due to specific possession goals, notably concern for 
its troops along the heavily-mined demarcation line in Korea. As momentum developed for such 
a treaty, however, the result of rigid US opposition was to stiffen those who sought a blanket 
approach that would not recognise such distinctions or potential opt-outs. Moreover, US civil 
society groups redefined the issue as one concerning humanitarian consequences of landmines 
rather than that of arms control or regional security, and joined with other NGOs in the 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) to bypass the Administration and engineer 
successful negotiation of the treaty (see International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 2005; 
Maresca & Maslen, 2000; Norwegian Nobel Committee, 1997; and Arms Control Today, 1997). 
The landmines treaty was ratified largely because a transnational advocacy campaign was able 
to persuade enough critical states that the humanitarian problem posed by landmines trumped 
any military utility these weapons served, and thus generated a ‘norms-cascade’ of state support 
for the ban (de Albuquerque, 2007; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, pp. 887-917; Price, 1998, pp. 
613-644). It is important to note, however, that most countries in the world were not facing 
security dilemmas in which landmines would be particularly relevant or useful, and thus the 
political gain of signing the treaty, in terms of public opinion and conveying the impression that 
one was a good international citizen, was far higher than the security cost of not employing 
landmines. Thus it is unclear whether normative persuasion really convinced governments to do 
something they otherwise would not have done, or whether the opportunity costs were simply so 
low as to offer few downsides. This proposition might be better evaluated by looking at the 
countries that did not sign the treaty, assuming that those states were faced with higher 
opportunity costs. In fact, while the treaty has 153 states parties and only 42 non-signatories, the 
non-signatories are significant international security actors such as the US, China, Russia, India, 
Israel, North and South Korea. EU member state Finland also has not signed, indicating that the 
Finns consider the normative win/security loss calculus to be too high (Price, 1998, p. 614; 
Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 901). 
4.  Summary and Conclusion: What do these typologies really tell us? 
Do they help us answer the question? 
In sum, our case studies reveal representative US instances for each of these stylised foreign 
policy types. Such categories, however, beg the deeper question: overall, which most closely 
reflects the core of US foreign policy? Which examples are representative of deeper currents in 
American society, and which are not? Which are exemplars and which are exceptions?  
Tocci acknowledges that the same international actor can display a normative, Realpolitik, 
imperial or status quo foreign policy in different regions and in different policy areas at different 
points in time. The case studies presented here indicate that the US, at least, can – and does in 
fact – engage in each of these ways simultaneously.  
This refutes the rather superficial claim that the US used to be a normative power but isn’t 
today. While most ‘normative power’ EU theorists acknowledge, in the words of Diez & 
Manners (2007, pp. 170, 174, 186), that the US “has exemplified the concept of a normative 
power during parts of its history”, particularly “in the inter-war and immediate post-war 
periods”, they deny that this has been true more recently. As this study has shown, however, the 
US advanced normative and non-normative goals, and deployed normative and non-normative 
means, before and after World War II, just as it does today. The reality is that the relative value 
or cost of these options has presented itself to every US administration and Congress; the US 
has not swung from purely normative phases to non-normative ones.  40 | DANIEL S. HAMILTON 
 
This underscores my point that the more appropriate question is not whether the US is a 
normative actor but the degree to which it is one. I submit that this is also the more appropriate 
question when it comes to analysing other countries as well. To answer this question it is 
necessary to determine where the real centre of gravity lies when it comes to characterising the 
US role in the world. This requires us in turn to assign some kind of weighting to the different 
paradigms. 
Overall, this review of US foreign policy indicates that the United States has been and continues 
to be simultaneously a guardian of norms established by the international community; a norm 
entrepreneur challenging those norms and on balance pushing the international community 
towards stronger norms enshrining human rights and the rule of law and democratic societies; a 
norm externaliser when it tries to advance norms for others that it is reluctant to apply to itself; 
and a norm blocker when it comes to issues that may threaten its position, or that exacerbate 
domestic divisions among the co-equal branches of American government or among the fluid 
yet often-conflicting currents of American domestic thought regarding America’s role in the 
world.  
In addition, due to shifting political constellations and the separation of powers inherent in the 
US constitutional system, it is not easy to predict where the US may come out on any particular 
normative issue. The open and rather fluid nature of the US system indicates that coalitions 
transcending nominal party allegiances need to be built on most issues, and the strength and 
durability of such coalitions depend not only on the issue at hand, but on its relationship to 
many other issues.
46  
Moreover, the particular weight of any one of these typologies varies over time. In general it 
may be said that the ‘normative intended’ dimension carries considerable weight and is a 
legitimate source of pride within the US foreign policy tradition. There are of course cases in 
which the US seeks to advance normative goals through normative means, but with major 
unintended consequences, but on the whole these appear to be less weighty. Over the course of 
the past 90 years, the US has also exhibited a strong tradition of hegemonic (as opposed to 
imperial) behaviour. There have been flashes of imperialism, but overall they have been 
subsumed within a broader pattern of hegemony. While one can certainly identify instances of 
US Realpolitik, intended or unintended, overall they appear to arise on a more case-by-case, ad 
hoc basis and thus seem less representative than the other two categories. There are fewer 
identifiable cases of US status quo orientation, but here again the case study approach limits the 
analysis, since the US is considered widely to be a major, if not the main, custodian and steward 
of the current international system.  
In sum, the mainstream of US foreign policy tends more often than not to reflect a varying blend 
of normative and hegemonic approaches. This mainstream tradition, however, has been 
challenged by the historically unusual Wilsonian-Jacksonian coalition that over the past six 
years has dominated the US executive branch, with only some countervailing influence by the 
legislative and judicial branches. Challenges to the mainstream in the 1990s instead came more 
often than not from influential Jacksonian and Jeffersonian elements in the Congress. These 
shifting coalitions indicate that it is premature to conclude that the US has turned from the 
fundamental instincts that have guided it for the past 60 years. The rhetoric of the major 
contenders for the presidency in 2008, in fact, seems truer to mainstream tradition than to US 
activities of the recent past. Clinton, McCain and Obama each essentially claim to be the person 
best able to pass what Henry Kissinger has called the historical test for this generation of 
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American leaders: how to use preponderant US power to achieve an international consensus 
behind widely accepted norms that will protect American values in a more uncertain future. 
As we have seen, there is a particularly acute tension within the normative-hegemonic approach, 
and that is the extent to which the US is willing or able to bind itself to the norms it advances 
for others. This tension has characterised US foreign policy for many decades. For instance, no 
country was more responsible than the United States for the creation of the United Nations, and 
President Harry Truman was clear from the outset what this would mean. On 25 June 1945, in 
his closing address to the San Francisco conference that drafted the UN Charter, he stated: 
“[W]e all have to recognize, no matter how great our strength, that we must deny ourselves the 
license to do always as we please.” This statement has not always sat comfortably with 
Truman's successors. As Stephen Schlesinger (2006) notes, “Washington discovered soon after 
the UN's birth that despite its veto power in the Security Council, it could not always control its 
wayward child. As a result, ever since 1945, US leaders have approached the UN with 
ambivalence: hoping, on the one hand, to use it to further US national security interests, while, 
on the other hand, worrying that too much involvement might constrain the United States' 
ability to act.”
47 This tension has characterised America’s approach to most international 
institutions and norms, even though public opinion polls consistently record strong public 
support for multilateral approaches to international challenges.  
The US has not always mastered this tension well. As Kalypso Nicolaidis (2004) notes, “in non-
American eyes, there is a world of differences between the ‘righteous might’ of Roosevelt’s era 
and the self-righteous might of George W. Bush”.  
On balance, however, and despite exceptions, over the past 60 years the US has sought to 
manage its normative-hegemonic interplay by accepting some limits on its power and being 
bound by broader international norms and commitments, in exchange for greater legitimacy and 
acceptance of its leadership by others. The unresolved question in the post-cold war, post-
September 11 world is whether the US and other key players are prepared to stick with this 
bargain, or whether the US will increasingly act as a ‘norm externaliser’, i.e. using its power to 
advance broad norms for others but refusing to apply such norms to itself, and whether other 
nations will refuse the ‘followership’ that leadership requires. “Nothing undermines US 
authority more than the perception that the United States considers itself too powerful to be 
bound by the norms we preach to others” notes former US National Security Advisor Sandy 
Berger (2004).  
5.  Postscript: Comparing the US and the EU 
Since this project was prompted by consideration of the EU as a normative power, and since 
much of the literature in this regard contains explicit or implicit references to the United States, 
a few points warrant consideration.  
First, much of the literature on the EU’s alleged ‘normative power’ ignores some fundamental 
underpinnings of European order that have enabled conceptions of ‘normative power’ to 
develop and be exercised at all. During the first half of the 20
th century, most Europeans 
squandered any pretension they might have had to normative leadership through two World 
Wars and continued colonial rule. Following World War II, the US security guarantee removed 
– at least for half a continent – a key source of European conflict: the perceived need by 
mistrustful European states to build arms and alliances against their own neighbours. The 
American security commitment offered west Europeans an umbrella under which they could 
reconcile and agree on new norms that could offer a common foundation upon which they could 
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work together and with others. Over time, the reassurances offered by a supportive – yet 
comfortably distant – hegemon enabled Europeans to create a community within which they 
could derive their security from each other rather than against each other. The very creation of 
the EU and the ability of its members to domesticate their foreign policies and render them 
normative rested on security guarantees provided by the United States.  
It is perhaps easy today to forget that NATO was the umbrella under which the European 
integration project could proceed, or that post-war institutions were created as much to prevent 
West Europeans from again dragging the world into conflict and depression as to prevent Soviet 
dominance or communist infiltration. As noted by Kalypso Nicolaidis (2004), “[T]he creation of 
a quasi-federation without collective security as a driving force was an aberration of history 
made possible to a great extent by the US”.
48 
Moreover, this security logic continues even today – despite the end of the cold war, despite 
September 11, and despite transatlantic and inner-EU squabbles over Iraq and other issues. The 
US continues to provide the ultimate reassurance enabling Europeans to reconcile, build and 
extend their Union. This is as evident in Kosovo today as it has been throughout the Balkans for 
the past decade and more.
49 This logic has been particularly evident in the determination of 
Central and Eastern European states to join NATO as well as the EU. New member states have 
been very clear about this relationship: while they have been keen to integrate with European 
societies within the EU, they are ultimately reassured in doing so through their membership in 
NATO.  
The ‘normative power’ Europe discourse is strangely silent on this point. I was struck that the 
case study of EU enlargement in the EU working paper failed to even mention the parallel 
process of NATO enlargement and the obvious relationship between the two. While each 
operates according to its own particular logic, most EU countries are NATO countries, and the 
same officials and populations have been addressing the same historic opportunity: to extend to 
as much of the European continent as possible the democratic, free-market space where war 
simply does not happen.  
This relates to a point Diez & Manners (2007, pp. 176, 180) have made about the relationship 
between normative and military power. “In contrast to civilian power”, they note, “normative 
power is not the opposite of military power. It is entirely conceivable that military force is used 
to back up the spread of normative values” and that “military capabilities may underpin 
normative power.” I couldn’t agree more. What is important to add, however, is that in some 
instances the military capabilities – and political commitment – that underpin the EU’s ability to 
project normative power are provided not by the EU but by the United States. 
Second, much of the literature describing ‘normative power EU’ is highly selective, including 
policies of EU member states when it is convenient and excluding them when it is not. There are 
two dimensions to this. The first has to do with foreign policy, where authority and competence 
still reside largely with member states. The EU, qua EU, in fact, has little real purview over the 
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vast range of foreign policy decisions confronting any particular EU nation. Any consideration 
of the EU as a normative foreign policy actor, therefore, needs to consider the actions of 
individual EU member states, not just examples of common EU action. This is important for our 
purposes because the tendency is to compare the EU with the United States. In one such 
comparison, for instance, Diez & Manners (2007, p. 182) argue that the US readily resorts to 
force, whereas “the fact” is that “the EU or, rather, EU member states consider the use of force a 
last resort”. Really? What about the British and Polish invasion of Iraq and Spanish support for 
it? What about German, British, French, Dutch, etc. intervention in the Balkans without a UN 
mandate? What about French or British interventions in Africa or the British intervention in the 
Falklands? My point is not to criticise such decisions, it is to ask for greater analytical rigor – 
for this, too, is the EU. 
The other dimension has to do with domestic policies, or the extent to which EU member states 
have coordinated and ‘domesticated’ aspects of their interactions with one another. There is no 
doubt that in many areas there have been successes, even as progress is halting in other areas. 
The issue is whether the EU’s ‘normative power’ is more effective through active projection of  
such ‘domesticated’ policies abroad or by offering a model to others by practicing such norms at 
home. This debate, while new to the EU, echoes the long-standing American debate between 
Jeffersonians and Wilsonians. The EU’s normative power in this regard seems to be more 
influential simply through its example at home – the fact that nations that regularly used 
violence against each other now join together in common cause in a variety of traditionally 
domestic policy areas. The EU has projected its ‘domesticated’ policies to close neighbours 
abroad mainly through accession negotiations with candidates aspiring to join the EU itself, as 
well as a web of arrangements – ranging from the Barcelona Process in the Mediterranean and 
Stabilisation and Association agreements with Balkan states to the Black Sea Synergy initiative 
and the EU’s ‘Four Spaces’ concept with Russia – that seek to extend EU notions of norms, 
order and structure in the EU’s periphery. The EU has had less success extending its particular 
version of norms or order on a global scale. The death penalty seems to be a prominent 
example, but even here success seems limited largely to Europe and Latin America, and 
problems of ratification and implementation in vast parts of the world remain (Katzenstein, 
2006). Nonetheless, the possibilities are intriguing. 
If one looks for examples beyond treaties and international law, however, one uncovers some 
promising experiments in the international extension of ‘domesticated’ EU policies – 
particularly with the United States. The recently created Transatlantic Economic Council, for 
instance, is in essence an effort to tie the US and the EU into a consultative process that 
identifies and then seeks to resolve domestic regulatory or policy barriers to the deeper 
integration of their economies, and to consider whether common standards developed through 
this process could form the basis for broader international norms. Yet it is striking that most of 
the literature either ignores the US dimension or goes to great pains to define ‘normative power 
EU’ against the US example. 
The US continues to set, or influence the formulation of standards in many parts of the world 
(often with EU support). So does the EU – often with US support. The US, for instance, 
understands that the EU is the legitimate framework within which such standards can be set in 
Europe, and does what it can to support their extension to wider Europe. The occasions where it 
objects are more the exception than the rule. I would therefore caution against the notion that 
the EU's regulatory norm-setting is unique or that it is being done at the expense of the US or 
has somehow ‘overtaken’ the US in some way. There is an ‘either-or’ quality to much of the 
‘normative power EU’ literature that just does not reflect the way the US and EU act in practice. 
These considerations lead to a third point – the role of the United States, or perhaps more 
accurately, stereotypes of the United States, in European debates about identity politics. 44 | DANIEL S. HAMILTON 
 
Proponents of ‘normative power EU’ refreshingly acknowledge that the notion of ‘normative 
power’ is part of the broader debate about identity politics in Europe, and as such requires an 
‘other’ against which such identities are constructed. “Not only is the success of this 
representation” of normative power EU “a precondition for other actors to agree to the norms 
set out by the EU”, state Diez & Manners (2007, pp. 173-188), “it also constructs an identity of 
the EU against an image of others in the ‘outside world’.” After reviewing the literature, 
however, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the ‘other’, whom the adherents of ‘normative 
power EU’ are constructing their arguments ‘against’ is in fact the EU’s closest partner, the 
United States. 
Diez and Manners explicitly seek to draw such distinctions. They argue that the American 
tradition of ‘exceptionalism’ essentially disqualifies the US from being considered a normative 
power, whereas it is precisely what they believe to be Europe’s ‘ordinariness’ that provides 
‘normative power EU’ with such strength and attraction. This represents almost wilful 
ignorance of the strong exceptionalist rhetoric that is part and parcel of daily European political 
debates. In fact, the very premise of normative power is that Europe is uniquely positioned to 
guide humanity to a better future.  
The more compelling distinction, it seems to me, is rooted in each partner’s sense of its own 
exceptionalism. As Kalypso Nicolaidis (2004) notes, historians trace difficulties between France 
and the United States to their similar sense of mission, of being the upholders of political and 
philosophical models for the world through the avowedly universal reach of their respective 18
th 
century revolutions. I would add that German critiques of the United States are also rooted in 
part in a German sense of exceptionalism: since Germany had been exceptionally evil, many 
Germans today believe their country must be exceptionally good. Since the US helped inculcate 
such beliefs in German society over two generations, it is particularly grating for Germans when 
US achievements fail to meet US aspirations, or when US demands of solidarity force Germans 
to abandon black and white in favour of grey. The moralistic undertone to much German 
critique is inescapable, even when it is not explicit. 
These dilemmas arise in part because both the US and the EU think of themselves as normative 
powers projecting their internal norms of democracy and human rights abroad. Nevertheless, 
these two competing forms of exceptionalism are of a different kind. As Nicolaidis (2004) 
notes:  
Their respective founding myths, the escape from despotism and the escape from 
nationalism, tyranny from above and tyranny from below, led both entities to elevate 
commitment to the rule of law as their core. But this was domestic law in the US, supra-
national law in the EU; this meant checks and balance between branches of government on 
one side, between states on the other. While the US progressively became a federal state, 
the EU, admittedly still in its infancy, is braced to remain a federal union of nation-states. 
In the last two decades, while both the US and the EU have been fertile grounds for 
exploring ‘subsidiarity’, and multilevel governance, the EU alone has explored ways of 
doing this without coordination by a centralized state, through methods that might one day 
be relevant to global governance. US exceptionalism is a national project; European a 
postnational one.
50 
Within this distinction lies an opportunity: to reconcile these different ‘normative’ traditions 
rather than to deny the legitimacy of one or the other or to ignore the common foundations upon 
which they are based – all in all, an attractive agenda for US-EU relations. 
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